



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Printed in the United States of America

Published July, 1923.

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GENERAL METAPHYSICS

or

ONTOLOGY

THE SCIENCE OF BEING

INTRODUCTION

1. The neglect of and prejudice against a science of metaphysics in modern philosophy is a logical sequence of the phenomenalism of Hume and the positivism of Comte and the critique of Kant. (For the basis of these systems is that nothing is knowable except what is the direct object of sensation.) (As the proper object of general metaphysics is reality stripped by abstraction of its concrete manifestation, by one stroke the agnostics, quoted above, make a real science of Ontology impossible.) (The philosophic theories upon which agnosticism is founded have been refuted in epistemology, and that refutation is the basis and defense of the treatise here presented on **Being in general**.) As a matter of fact many of the questions herein set forth are vigorously debated in all modern schools of thought.

2. Definition

Etymologically, (Ontology is the science of **Being**.)

Really, (Ontology is the science of things as they are exhibited under their most abstract and common characteristics.) (Or it is the science which considers "being" and those things which are a consequence of "being.")

(The scope of Ontology is to consider objective realities under their most abstract phases: But the most abstract reality is "being". Moreover, Ontology considers those determinations which are common to all reality, i.e. those things which are the consequences of "being".)

(Such determinations of **Being** are divisible into two classes; a) those which are common altogether to all beings, viz. unity, truth, goodness; b) those which belong to all beings disjunctively; these are substance and accident; God and creature, cause and effect, potency and act, etc.)

(The office of Ontology is twofold—a) It expounds and illustrates the most abstract notions of being and defends, if necessary, their objective validity, b) It states and establishes the first principles or axioms which flow from these notions.)

3. (All real entities whether actually existent or only possible of existence constitute the **material object** of Ontology.)

(The characteristics common to all real entities are the **formal object** of Ontology.)

4. Division

(It is convenient to divide **Ontology** into three parts.

- a) Being and the transcendental qualities of being.
- b) The categories or primary classes of being.
- c) The causes and perfections of being.)

BOOK I.

BEING AND THE TRANSCENDENTAL QUALITIES OF BEING

5. The most abstract and common of notions are called transcendental. They are six: being, thing, somewhat, one, true, good. The first three are synonymous. The last three are predicable of each and every reality. For this reason they are called the "transcendental qualities of being", the "common attributes of being", the "common modes of being".

Being in its proper sense is **real being** viz., that which can exist in itself. In its metaphorical sense it is an "entity of reason" which can exist **objectively** only in the intellect.

Moreover, in real being we can consider two things: essence and existence. Existence is either actual or possible.

Hence the first book is divided thus:

Chapter I—Article I—The concept of being.

Article II—The abstraction, comprehension and extension of being.

Article III—The contraction of being.

Article IV—The analogy of being.

Article V—The unity of being.

Appendix—Entity of reason.

Chapter II—Being in potency and act.

Article I—General notion of potency and act.

Article II—Essence and existence as potency and act.

Article III—The possibles.

Chapter III—The transcendental qualities of being.

Article I—Unity and distinction.

Article II—Truth and falsity

Article III—Goodness and evil.

Chapter I.

ARTICLE I.

The concept of being.

6. The psychological origin of the concept of being. We are living in a world of multiple and diverse entities, which are a universe apart in size and shape and qualities; our gaze falls upon heaven and earth, men and brutes, trees and stones. Yet, however great and striking may be the differences between all realities—they are all alike in this—they are **something**, and not **nothing**. Under this aspect all things which we perceive are in agreement, whether they be those realities of which we have knowledge only from reason, as God, or those which we immediately apprehend by our senses, as the material universe, or those which are only possible, as a golden mountain. All these things are alike in this—they are something and not altogether **nothing**.

7. Moreover, our mind is endowed with a power which is in the highest sense **abstractive**. For this reason it can represent one of many characteristics which are really identified without representing the others with which it is identical. And so although the things about us, the visible world, God, the possibles, are different in almost every way, the mind can abstract from their differences and embrace them all under that characteristic in which they are similar.

This objective characteristic is **being**. **Being** is that which is—and all the entities mentioned above **are**.

8. **Being** cannot be defined by a strict definition. The notion can be clarified by its relations, a) to existence, b) to its opposite, c) to the intellect. (Coffey, Pg. 35)

A. **Being relative to existence**

According to its grammatical form, being is the participle

of the verb "to be", which means to exist. Every participle can be looked at in a twofold way, participially, viz: as actually exercising the form of the infinitive; and as a noun, viz. that which has the aptitude to exercise the form of the infinitive (cf. Rother, Being, pp. 5-8)

Hence—a) Being as a **participle** is that which actually exists.

b) Being as a **noun** is that which exists or can exist —it is that which is an existible reality.

Being, therefore in this treatise, signifies whatsoever has the aptitude to exist, whether it actually exists or not.

B. Opposition to Nothing

Nothing has a positive and a negative sense.

Positive nothing is that which actually is not existent, v.g. a golden mountain.

Negative nothing is that which is not existible, v.g. a square circle.

C. Being in its relation to the intellect.

Being is that which is intelligible in itself or which can be a direct object of thought.

9. There is one problem only with regard to the concept of **being**: what is the relation between **being** and its proper modes of primary determinations. All being is either independent or necessary being, dependent or contingent being, substantial or accidental being, hence the primary determinations of being are "independent or necessary" — "dependent or contingent" — "substantial" or "accidental". Independent or necessary being is God. Dependent or contingent beings are creatures, substantial beings are substances, accidental beings are accidents. All being, therefore, is either God or creature, is either a substance or an accident.

This one problem with regard to the concept of being involves four questions:

1) By what operation of the mind do we obtain the concept of being as such, or how does the mind abstract or prescind from the primary determinations of **being**?

2) Is the concept of **being as such** really transcendental?

3) How is being predicated of its immediate inferiors viz: is the notion of being univocal, equivocal or analogous?

4) Is the objective concept of being **one** or is it **multiple**?

10. Various Opinions

1) Scotus in answer to these questions denies that the

primary determinations of **being** are **being**, hence he logically concludes:

1—There is a perfect precision between “being” and its primary determinations.

2—The concept of “being” has perfect unity.

3—Being is predicated of its inferiors univocally.

2) Cajetan denies that the concept of being precinds from its modes or primary determinations explicitly but only in a confused manner; as the sight of a multitude afar. Hence he logically concludes that the concept of “being” is not one but multiple.

3) Suarez teaches the following:

1—There is an imperfect precision between “Being” and its primary determinations.

The modes are conceived in the concept of being but not as modes but merely as entities or being.

2—The concept of being has unity but the unity is imperfect.

3—“Being” is predicated of its immediate inferiors analogically.

Note. “Mode” and “Difference”. A concept which modifies another concept by adding a note which is not contained in the concept to be modified is called a “difference”. The modified concept is called a “genus”. The note of “rationality” is added to “animality” to get “rational animal”. A “mode” added to another concept does not bring something altogether new but merely shows the various states in which something can exist. Such are the primary determinations of being or the “modes” of being enumerated above.

Article II.

The Abstraction, Comprehension and Extension of Being

THESIS I.

The notion of “being as such” precinds from its modes. However, this precision is not perfect, but imperfect and not mutual.

11. The concept is either **subjective** or **objective**.

The subjective concept is the act of the mind by which

some note (or notes) is apprehended. The **objective** concept is the note (or notes) which is apprehended by the act of the mind.

12. **Precision** is the operation of the mind by which of many things which are really identified, one is conceived without the others. By this mental activity one note really identified with others is considered separately.

Precision is merely **formal**, if it takes place without an **objective** basis.

Precision is **objective**, if it has a basis outside of the mind.

This **objective** basis is present, if an entity has many perfections (or notes) of which one can be conceived without the other, because it can exist separate from the other. Thus "life" is a perfection of the plant; in the plant, it is really identified with "corporeity". Nevertheless, "life" can be conceived without "corporeity", because it can exist in other entities separate from "corporeity".

The **objective** basis is **perfect** if the abstracted perfection (or note) can be conceived without in any way, implicitly or explicitly, including the perfections with which it is identified. The **objective** basis is **imperfect** if the abstracted note includes in any way the perfections with which it is identified. Thus the "wisdom of God" includes all the other perfections of God implicitly.

13. **Objective** precision is **perfect**, if the basis is **perfect**, otherwise it is **imperfect**.

Objective precision is **mutual**, if neither of the two perfections which are identified can be formally predicated of the other. **Objective** precision is **non-mutual**, if one of the perfections can be formally predicated of the other but not vice-versa.

14. The modes of which there is question in the thesis are the four determinations which immediately contract "being" viz. "independent" "dependent", "substantial", "accidental"

The thesis has four parts:

15. **Adversaries.**

Cajetan denies the whole thesis. For he claims that the concept of being does not prescind from its modes, but includes them in a confused manner.

Scotus admits the first part but denies the remaining

three. Since he denies that the modes are "being", he logically concludes that the concept of being prescinds from its modes.

Proof of the First Part

16. Unless the concept of "being" prescinds from its modes, contradictions would be verified of contradictions.

But this is impossible.

Therefore the concept of "being" prescinds from its modes.

Proof of Major: If the concept of "being" includes the perfection or mode "independent" **formally**, every entity could be said to be "independent". Therefore also the **creature** which according to its definition is "dependent".

Proof of the Second Part

17. In perfect precision one note can be perfectly conceived without the others.

But "being" cannot be conceived without also conceiving the modes of "being".

Therefore, the precision between "being" and its modes is not perfect.

Proof of Minor: For since the **modes** are "being", they are somehow or other included in the concept of being.

2. Against Scotus.

The modes are either something or nothing.

But they are not nothing.

Therefore they are something or "being".

Proof of Third Part

18. In imperfect precision one note is so conceived that the others are not excluded, although they are not conceived distinctly.

But "being as such" is conceived in such wise that the modes are not excluded.

Therefore the precision between "being" and its modes is imperfect.

Proof of Minor: The modes are included in the notion of "being" although they are not as modes, but merely as entities or "being".

19. "Being" can be formally predicated of its modes, for we rightly say "independence" or "necessity" is "being". On the contrary, the "modes" cannot be predicated of "being"; for it would be wrong to say "Being" is "independence" or "necessity".

20. **Corollary.** The abstraction by which we gain the notion of "being" is not obtained by representing one perfection which is "being" and omitting another which is "independence", but the mind looking at the whole object attends only to its "**opposition to nothingness**".

In other words the mind does not consider one distinct note or perfection but considers the whole entity according to a characteristic which is indistinct, indeterminate, confused. This characteristic is the opposition of the entity to **nothingness**. But the mind does **not** consider how the entity is opposed to nothing. Moreover, in this indeterminate note are actually contained all the perfections of this entity. They are not, however, contained according to their **proper** characteristics, but only in as far as they have similarity according to the indeterminate characteristic represented.

N.B. A **corollary** is a proposition the truth of which spontaneously flows from an established thesis.

A **scholion** is everything which is added to a thesis for the sake of explanation or illustration.

21. Difficulties

1. The notion which **includes** its inferiors cannot **prescind** from them. But the notion of being **includes** its inferiors.

Therefore, it cannot prescind from them.

Objections of the Scotist School

1. The limit of "being" is not being, just as the limit of water is not water but the vase. But the modes of "being" are the limits of "being".

Therefore the modes are not "being".

2. The perfection by which two beings are similar cannot be the perfection by which they are dissimilar.

But the primary modes of "being" are the perfections by which beings are dissimilar.

3. If the modes of "being" were "being" they would add nothing to "being". But this is false.

Therefore the modes of "being" are not "being".

4. If "being" contained all the "modes", contradictories would be verified of the same thing at the same time.

But this is absurd. Therefore, etc.

Before answering this difficulty state to yourself how the modes are contained in the concept of "being" in the opinion of Scotus, of Cajetan, of Suarez.

5. A mode of "being" does not represent what the being is but how it is. But how a being is, is not "being".
6. The primary modes are "being" and something else. But whatever is something other than being is not being.
-

THESIS II.

Being as such is a notion most simple, most common and transcendental.

22. A simple entity is that which is not composed of parts and cannot be resolved into many things.

Its opposite is a composite entity.

Real simplicity is opposed to real composition.

Logical simplicity has reference to concepts. We are concerned only with logical simplicity.

Common is that which pertains to many entities. Its opposite is singular, an entity in itself one and not multiple.

Transcendental is that which pertains to all things.

Note I.—"Simple" refers to the comprehension of the notion of "being"; "common" and "transcendental" refer to its extension. In other words the comprehension of the notion of "being" is least of all notions; its extension is the greatest.

Note II.—The superlatives, which in the thesis are attributed to the notion of "being" are to be taken absolutely not relatively. We deny that there are any other notions more simple or common or transcendental than this notion, though there are others which are equally so.

23. This thesis has two parts.

A. Being as such is a most simple notion.

B. Being as such is a most common and transcendental notion.

Adversaries: Scotus and his school deny that the notion of being as such is transcendental; for it does not extend to the determinations of being. Their arguments are contained in the objections to the first thesis.

24. Proof of First Part

That is a most simple notion which cannot be resolved into notions more simple.

But such is the notion of "being as such".

Therefore, the notion of "being as such" is most simple.
Major: By the testimony of consciousness, the notion of being represents only one note, viz: the aptitude to exist.

Proof of the Second Part

25. That notion is most common and transcendental which is included in all things which in any way are—

But such is the notion of "being as such".

Therefore, it is most common and transcendental.

Minor: Whatever is not "being" is nothing: whatever is not nothing is "being".

26. **Corollary I.**—Therefore "being as such" extends itself not only to entities which actually exist, but also to those which can exist—or to the "possibles". For the "possibles" are not absolute nothing; they are something.

Corollary II.—Therefore, just as whatever is, is "being": so also the notion of "being" is included in **all other notions**. Just as the eye cannot see an object unless it is colored, so the mind cannot apprehend an object except in as far as it has "being".

Corollary III.—Therefore, no notion can be divided into the notion of "being" and some other notion: for the other notion would contain the notion of "being".

Objections

27. 1. The most simple being is God. Therefore the most simple notion ought to be the notion of God.

2. If the notion of "being" is the first and most simple of notions, either the notion of "being" would be the notion of God, or something would be before God, and more simple than He is.

But the notion of "being" is not the notion of God, and it is repugnant for something to be before God and more simple than He is.

Scholion: Other characteristics of the notion of "being".

28. 1. The notion of "being" is the first of all notions in the process of rational thought.

2. It is also the first of all notions in the chronological order. Our intellectual activity must proceed from the simplest and easiest of all notions to those which are clearer and more determinate, i.e. from the vague notion of "being" to the notions of definite **modes** of "being".

3. It is the most indeterminate of notions, expressing the single note, **opposition to absolute nothing**.

4. Since the notion of "being" cannot be resolved into simpler notions it cannot strictly speaking be defined. We can only describe it by considering its relation to **existence**, that which exists or can exist—or its opposition to **nothing**, that which is not absolute nothing, or its relation to our mind, that which can be an object of thought.

5. "Being" is not "genus", because "genus" is not included in its differences. It is not a species, which is composed of genus and difference, whilst "being" is simple. Nor is it difference, which distinguishes one class from another. Nor is it accident or property which are superadded to essence. Moreover, "being" cannot be said to be a "supreme genus." There are in reality ten such—the Aristotelian Categories.

Abstr. Ind.
" *Def.*
Metaph. Ind.
" *Def.*
Article III.

The Contraction of Being

THESIS III.

"Being" is not contracted to its inferiors by way of metaphysical composition, but by logical composition.

(29) This thesis is in reality a corollary of the first thesis; for contraction is a process inverse to distinction.

Contraction is the restricting of a common concept by an ulterior determination. Thus by the addition of "rational" to "animal", the latter common concept is restricted in its application to "man". Contraction is the result of addition or composition.

(30) Composition is the union of things which are distinct. It is threefold:

- a—Physical, when the things united are actually distinct;
- b—Metaphysical, when the things united are only distinct by a distinction of reason, but are mutually exclusive.
- c—Logical, when the contracting determination is nothing else than the common concept more distinctly expressed; as Suarez says—"Logical composition is the resultant of a clearer concept of one and the same reality". For example

the common concept of "heat" can be contracted to represent "heat" at 98°. The grade of heat expressed adds no new reality distinct from heat, but now there is a clear conception of what before was only conceived indistinctly and indeterminately.

Note—As is evident, logical composition is not composition in the strict sense, for the concepts are not adequately distinct.

31. Inferiors are the objects or individuals to which an idea can be applied. There is explicit reference in the thesis to the **immediate inferiors** of the notion of "being", viz: those to which the "notion" of being primarily descends: these are "independent being,"—"dependent being" — "substantial being", "accidental being". For in these four the notion of being as such is found in its maximum differentiation.

32. **Adversaries** — The Scotists, who teach that the "modes" are outside the notion of "being" and consequently maintain that the composition is metaphysical.

Proof of the First Part

33. Those entities only are compounded metaphysically which are mutually exclusive.

But "being" and its modes are not mutually exclusive.

Therefore, "being" and its modes are not compounded metaphysically.

Proof of the Second Part

34. Logical composition obtains between two notions which, though not mutually exclusive, nevertheless are not altogether the same.

But such are the notions of "being" and its modes.

Therefore, logical composition obtains between "being" and its modes.

Major: Both of these conditions are required for logical composition. For if the notions are mutually exclusive, the composition is metaphysical; if the notions are altogether the same, there is no composition.

Minor: a—The modes include "being" in their comprehension;

b—"Being" differs from the modes, for although it includes them, it does not express them determinately.

35. **Corollary I**—Therefore it is evident how the notion of “being” is contracted. To the notion of being there is added a characteristic or determination which was not included in the bare and indeterminate notion of “being”.

Corollary II—Therefore, the “modes” of “being” signify altogether the same reality as being itself.

Corollary III—Therefore “independence”—“dependence”—“substantiality”—“accidentality” are not “metaphysical grades”.

36. **Scholion I**—A proper appreciation of the way in which the notion of “being” is conceived by the mind to apply to the data of experience is indispensable for the defence of Theism against Pantheism. The one who admits metaphysical composition between “being” and its “modes” is led logically to Pantheism. For the same “being” is predicated in exactly the same sense of God and creature.

Scholion II—How is the determinate notion of being gradually contracted and determined to the individual?

- a—“Being” is determined by its transcendental modes—(one, true, good.) By this the notion of being is not restricted but is only considered under its triple aspect.
- b—The notion of “being” is determined through its proper modes, but is not yet compounded metaphysically.
- c—After “being” is determined to the “supreme genera”, metaphysical composition begins.
- d—The ultimate species is contracted to the individual, in whom is found the whole reality of being.

Difficulties

1. The concept of substance can be resolved into two concepts, “being” and “substantiality”.
2. If the thesis were true, there would be no composite concepts.
But this is absurd. Therefore, etc.
3. The concept which cannot be contracted is infinite.
But the notion of being is not infinite.
Therefore, etc.
4. Where there is distinction, there is found composition.
But there is distinction between “being” and its “modes”.

5. If the modes are contained in the concept of "being", analysis should reveal them.
But analysis does not reveal them—Therefore, etc.
6. Two metaphysical realities are the result of metaphysical composition. But "being" and "substantiality" are two metaphysical realities.
Therefore, etc.

N.B. A metaphysical reality is an integral metaphysical grade. To have two distinct metaphysical realities, we must have mutual exclusion of concepts.

ARTICLE IV.

The Analogy of Being

THESIS IV.

"Being" in relation to its immediate inferiors is neither univocal nor equivocal, but is metaphysically analogous.

(38) An **univocal** term is one which is applied to many according to the same signification. An **equivocal** term is one which is applied to many according to a signification entirely different. An **analogous** term is one applied to many objects according to a signification which is partly the same and partly different.

Note 1—The same term can be univocal, equivocal, analogous, with regard to different inferiors e.g. man is univocal, with reference to Peter and Paul, analogous with regard to Peter and his photograph. Hence in asking whether a term is analogous or univocal or equivocal, attention must be paid to the objects to which the term is applied.

Note 2—As the terms so the objective concepts are divided into univocal, equivocal, analogous.

39. **Analogy** is twofold:

a—**Metaphysical**, if the essence as abstracted from determination, is partly the same and partly different in the various analogates.

b—**Physical**, if the essence together with its determinations is partly the same and partly different; e.g. all "genera" are physically

analogous, though metaphysically univocal.

40. Univocation is threefold:

a—Metaphysical, if the abstract essence is altogether the same in the different inferiors, e.g. life in a tree, a bird, a man.

b—Physical, if the concrete essence, is the same in different inferiors, e.g. life in Peter and Paul.

c—Logical, if the essence is common to many objects; but, nevertheless, does not perfectly prescind from its determinations.

41. The thesis is **restricted** to **immediate** inferiors, viz: to those which constitute the four classes of being.

The thesis has three parts.

Adversaries:

1. Aureolus—"Being" is equivocal.

2. Scotists—"Being" is univocal.

3. Mastrius and Lossada—"Being" is something midway between univocal and analogous.

Proof of the First Part

42. That notion is not univocal which is diversified in its inferiors because of an intrinsic principle. But such is the notion of being in reference to its immediate inferiors. Therefore, the notion of being is not univocal with regard to its immediate inferiors.

Major: That which is intrinsically diversified in its descent does not remain metaphysically the same.

Minor: The notion of "being" is diversified by its "modes" which are intrinsic to "being".

Proof of the Second part

43. An equivocal term is a term applied to objects entirely different. But "being" is not such a term.

Therefore, being is not equivocal.

Minor: The inferiors are **alike** in this, they are something and **not nothing**.

Proof of the Third Part

(44) That notion is metaphysically analogous which is applied to its inferiors with a signification partly the same and partly different. But such is the notion of "being" with regard to its immediate inferiors.

Therefore, the notion of being with regard to its immediate inferiors is metaphysically analogous.

Minor: The immediate inferiors are in agreement in this that they are something. They differ in the very notion of "being". For "independent being" and "dependent being" differ as "independent" and "dependent". In other words, "being in its inferiors is variant "being". ~~God is entirely "being" in its inferiors is variant "being".~~ God is entirely different than the creature is.

45. **Corollary I**—Therefore no notion is predicated in the same sense of God and creature. For all notions essentially involve the notion of "being". Thus when we say "God is just" and "man is just", justice belongs to "God" in a different and more perfect way than to man.

Corollary II—Therefore, we have not a "proper" concept of God, in as far as "proper" is opposed to analogous. true of substance and accident.

Difficulties

46. 1—Being is not nothing.
But **not nothing** is the same in all inferiors.
Therefore, etc.
- 2—A simple notion has no parts.
Therefore it can not be **partly** the same **partly** different.
- 3—If "being" and "independent being" are the same reality, then being would include the "divine perfections".

THESIS V.

The analogy of being is that of intrinsic attribution.

47. Analogy is divided into analogy of attribution and proportion. The analogy of attribution is either intrinsic or extrinsic; that of proportion proper or metaphorical.

Analogy of attribution is present, when the thing signified belongs to one analogate primarily and to the second with reference to the first. It is either intrinsic, when the thing signified is in both analogates **formally**, or **extrinsic**, when the thing signified is **formally** only in the **principal** analogate.

48. Analogy of proportion is the imperfect similitude of two relations, v.g. as the eye is to the body, so the intellect

is to the soul. It is **proper**, when the thing signified is **formally** in both analogates, v.g. accident as predicated of both quantity and quality. It is **metaphysical** when the thing signified is formally in one analogate and said to be in the other only because of a similitude with regard to the first, (v.g.) the fields are smiling.

With regard to analogous things, two points are to be noted:

1st—Those things which are signified by a term which is analogous with the analogy of extrinsic attribution and of metaphorical proportion can not be represented by one concept—and hence can not be used as the middle term of a syllogism.

2nd—Those things which are signified by a term which is analogous with the analogy of intrinsic attribution and proper proportion can be expressed by one concept and can be used as a middle term.

Note: The thesis is defended in the affirmative sense. We say that “being” is analogous with the analogy of **intrinsic** attribution. We do not deny that the analogy of being can be considered in another way.

Proof of the First Part

49. The analogy of “being” is that of attribution.

There is the analogy of attribution where the thing signified is primarily and of its nature in the principal analogate, and in the secondary analogates only with dependence on the first.

But such is “being”. Therefore, the analogy of “being” is that of attribution.

Minor: “Being” pertains to God primarily and of its nature; to creatures secondarily and with dependence on God. “Being” belongs to substance primarily; to accidents only with dependence on substance.

Proof of the Second part

50. The analogy of “being” is intrinsic.

That analogy is intrinsic, when the thing signified is in all the analogates formally.

But such is “being”. Therefore, the analogy of “being” is intrinsic.

Minor: God and creature, substance and accident, are formally and really “being”.

51. **Corollary I**—Therefore, the creature can be conceived and defined without a previous knowledge of God; the reason is because the analogy of being is intrinsic. Creature is understood in the specificative, not duplicative sense.

Corollary II—Therefore, the foundation of the analogy of “being” is twofold: a) the dependence of all “being” on God and of all accidents on substance;
b) the transcendency or likeness of “beings” amongst themselves.

Difficulties

52. 1. If the analogy of “being” is that of attribution, the creature ought to be defined in relation to the principal analogate, viz. God.
But the creature is not so defined. Therefore, etc.
2. The “son” essentially depends upon the “father”. Nevertheless “man” is univocally predicated of “father” and “son”.
Therefore, dependence is no sign of analogy.
3. The notion of “being” omits all dissimilitude and expresses that characteristic alone in which all entities are similar.
But such a characteristic is perfectly similar in its inferiors. Therefore the notion of “being” is not analogous.
4. “Genus” is different in its inferiors, and, nevertheless is said to be univocal.
Therefore difference in inferiors is no sign of analogy.

Article V.

The Unity of Being

THESIS VI.

The subjective and objective concept of “being” is one; the unity of the objective concept is imperfect.

53. One is that which is undivided in itself. Unity is indivision.

Real unity is that which exists in things independent of the mind. (The unity of a house, a tree)

Logical unity is that which belongs to things as a consequence of a mental operation. It consists in this, that a nature expressed by a concept is so similar in its inferiors, that one and the same concept is capable of representing it.

This **unity** is twofold:

a—Perfect—if the common nature is perfectly similar in its inferiors.

b—Imperfect—if the common nature is imperfectly similar.

54. The thesis has three parts:

1—The subjective concept is **one really**

2—The objective concept is **one logically**

3—The unity of the objective concept is **imperfect**.

Adversaries:

Against the 1st part—Cajetan

Against the 2nd part—Cajetan

Against the 3rd part—The Scotists.

Sense of the thesis:

1st—Since the subjective concept is an act of the mind—the question is asked whether one act of the mind suffices to conceive “being” or whether many acts are required. As is evident, this unity is real.

2nd—The objective concept is that characteristic or perfection which is immediately represented through the subjective concept. We are asking whether there is some objective perfection, viz. the perfection of “being” in which all things are similar, so that they can be represented without considering the characteristics by which they are different. As is evident, this unity is logical.

3rd—Hence we assert that the unity of the objective concept is imperfect.

Proof of the First Part

55. **Consciousness** testifies that when we think of “beings”, “things” or hear the words, our mind is not agitated by two thoughts, as when it considers “bow” as a nod of the head and the forward part of a ship. Rather does the mind advert to one thing, as when it considers man. This proves that the act of the mind or the subjective concept which represents “being” is one act and not multiple.

Proof of the Second Part

56. That the objective concept of "being" may be one, two things are required.

- a) On the part of the inferiors, there must be some characteristic or perfection common to all.
- b) On the part of the intellect, there must be the power to abstract this common element from the perfections by which the inferiors differ.

But all the inferiors of "being" have this in common they are "something" and "not nothing" and the mind has a power which is in the highest sense abstractive.

Therefore, the intellect can represent this objective characteristic which is common and thus give it a logical oneness.

Proof of the Third Part

57. A concept which is analogous with the analogy of **intrinsic attribution** is imperfectly one.

But the objective concept of "being" is analogous with the analogy of **intrinsic attribution**. Therefore, the objective concept of "being" is imperfectly one.

Major: The common nature expressed by such a concept is one in such wise that it is diversified in its inferiors by reason of itself and not by reason of differences added from without.

On Conceptual Entities or Entities of Reason.

58. Entity of reason properly so called, viz. in as far as it is opposed to real entity or "being" is defined as that which can exist only objectively in the mind.

An entity of reason of itself can be understood in a three-fold sense:

- 1—**Effectively**, as an entity which by real efficiency is produced through an operation of the mind.
- 2—**Subjectively**, as an accident inhering in the mind.
(taken in these two senses—an entity of reason is not opposed to "real being"—but it is "real being".)
- 3—**Objectively**, as a known object. But that which is objectively in the mind
 - a) either exists in itself or can exist, or
 - b) has no other entity except this, that it can be an object of thought. In this final

sense alone is an entity of reason opposed to real "being".

Every word of the definition is of important. If the word "objectively" is omitted, the definition extends itself to some real entities, viz. acts of the mind. If the word **only** is omitted the definition includes all real entities. If instead of "can exist" one puts "exists", the definition would include the possibles not actually existing.

2) Entities of reason are divided into **negative**, **privative**, **relative**.

A **negative** entity of reason is a negative conceived as if it were something, e.g. vacuum.

A **privative** entity of reason is a privation conceived as if it were an entity, e.g. blindness, conceived as a quality.

A **relative** entity of reason is that by which something is conceived after the manner of a relation though no real relation exists, e.g. (genus, species).

That thing which the intellect understands by means of the entity of reason, viz: the thing signified exists but it is not found as a positive entity thus blindness exists independent of the mind, but not as a positive entity.

Chapter II.

Being in Potency and Act

ARTICLE I.

General Notion of Potency and Act

59. "Being" is that which **can** be. In this definition the word "can" prescinds from the fact as to whether the entity actually exists or not. Hence, we have twofold "being" — "being" in **potency** and "being" in **act**. "Potentia et actus dividunt ens commune".

I—Potency

1. **Potency** in the strict sense is a principle of operation, e.g. walking, talking.
2. **Potency** in the wider sense is **power to produce**

or receive something. It is of this potency that we are speaking.

60. Divisions

a) **Objective and subjective potency.**

Objective (logical, ideal, metaphysical) potency is the capacity of a non-existent thing to exist.

Subjective (real, physical) potency is the capacity of an existing thing to produce or receive. It is called subjective, because it is in a subject already existing. It is twofold: A—**Active** potency is the capacity to confer some perfection, or the principle of changing something from “non-being” to “being”.

B—**Passive** potency is the capacity to receive some perfection, e.g. in marble, the potency to receive the form of a statue.

Note: Active potency from its concept is a perfection, passive potency connotes imperfection, hence the first is in God but not the second.

b) **Natural and obediential potency.**

Natural potency is that which is reduced to act through the forces of nature, e.g. in the soul the power to acquire knowledge.

Obediential potency is the capacity of the creature for a supernatural act, e.g. in the soul the capacity to receive grace.

II—Act

61. “Act” is one of the simplest of notions and so cannot be defined. Potency is described and specified by its relation to “act”. Both notions illustrate each other; one can not be conceived without the other.

“Act” is the perfection filling some capacity. It is the perfection for which “potency” implies capacity, whilst connoting its absence.

The “act” of existence corresponds to **objective** potency; **action** corresponds to **active** potency; the formal act or the form corresponds to **passive** potency.

The “form” is that by which an entity is constituted in a certain grade of perfection. Thus the soul is called the

form of the body—because through it the body has the perfection of life.

62. Divisions. The substantial and accidental act.

- a) The **substantial** act is the perfection constituting an entity in subsisting being, v.g. the soul with regard to the body.

The **accidental** act is any ulterior determination of a being already constituted as a substance.

- b) **Act of itself** and **Act of another**.

An **act of itself** is the act (perfection, reality, being) which subsists of itself without in any way having an exigency to exist in something else. Thus an angel is said to be an act or a form. An **act of another** is an act which is ordered by its own nature to fulfill the **subjective** capacity of something else.

It is A—a **physical** act, if the other thing is really distinct. e.g. the soul from the body.

B—a **metaphysical** act, if the other thing is only distinct with a distinction of reason.

- c) **First act** and **second act**

The **First Act** is the substance of the thing, or the potency.

The **second act** is the operation.

The first and proximate act is present if all the conditions for operation are at hand; the first and remote act, if they are not. Thus "wood" in itself is a "first act", "wet wood" is in first and remote act; "dry wood placed near a fire" is first and proximate act; "burning" wood in "second" act.

- d) **Pure** and **Non-Pure Act**

Pure act is that which has no admixture of passive potency, viz: that which is neither the act of a potency, nor is in potency to any other act. God only is **Pure Act**.

Non-pure act is that which has an admixture of passive potency. All finite entities are non-pure acts. For merely **material** entities are in potency to non-being and to

new substantial acts; composite beings are in potency to non-being; all finite entities are in potency to ulterior accidental acts.

III. Transition from Potency to Act

63. The transition from potency to act is called "becoming".

This transition to act can be either from **subjective** or from **objective** potency. From immediate experience we only know the transition from subjective potency to act. This transition is called "change".

"Change" is the transition of an entity from one mode of existence to another. There are three elements, the "term from which", "the term to which" and the "subject". The "terms from which" and the "terms to which" are either "total" or "formal". The total "term from which" is the subject with the form to be changed. The formal "term from which" is the form to be changed. The total "term to which" is the subject with the new form. The **formal** "term to which" is the form to which the subject passes.

"Change" is specified and determined by the "term to which". Thus a body is said to be heated when it is changed from cold to hot.

64. Division of mutation or change. "Change" is positive or negative according as the "term to which" is positive or negative, v.g. generation or corruption. "Change" is substantial or accidental according as the "term to which" is a substance or an accident. It is instantaneous or successive according as the change happens in an instant or is gradual.

Being "in fieri" and "in facto esse".

Being "in fieri" is that which is not merely in potency to its act, and yet has not yet fully been actuated, e.g. a house partly constructed. Being "in facto esse" is that which is completely actuated, e.g. a constructed house.

Chapter II.

ARTICLE II.

Essence and Existence as Potency and Act

65. The notion of "being as such" is extended both

to things which are actual and to things which can be actualized or are possible. The precision by which this most abstract concept is acquired is not perfect or adequately objective. Amongst the determinations by which "independent being" and "dependent being" differ in such wise that it is impossible to adequately prescind from this difference, is the relation of "being" to actual existence. "Independent being" or God, as will be demonstrated in Natural Theology is a being whose existence is absolutely necessary and which also is physically and metaphysically simple. This means that there is no composition in God, either physical or metaphysical. Since this is so there is no need of further inquiry here as to the relation between the "Divine Essence" and its existence. For essence and existence are identified in God, His essence is existence. On the contrary, all "dependent" or "contingent" beings are alike in this, they can exist actually or not exist. Hence it is clear that actual existence does not enter into the metaphysical concept of contingent beings. Moreover, any contingent nature can be looked at according to the totality of its reality in such wise that abstraction is made from this, whether it actually exists or not.

Notions of Essence

66. Essence is that by which a thing is that which it is. The essence is that in an entity which corresponds to the question, what is this thing.

Since essence is that by which a thing is what it is, it is also said to be that by which a thing is constituted in a certain species of being. Since the species is called a "form", essence is also called the form of a thing, in the sense that humanity is said to be the form of man. Moreover, that by which a thing is constituted in "being" is the fountain source and root of all its properties and so essence is said to be the principle and foundation of the properties of a thing. Finally since "action follows essence" essence is also called the principle of operation and under this aspect is denominated nature.

Essence, therefore, as it is in an entity independent of all mental operation, is all that which makes an entity what it is and by which it is distinguished from "nothing" and from every other "thing". That constitutes the essence of an entity which in it is required and is sufficient that the entity may be and remain this thing.

67. Divisions of essence.

- 1) According to our manner of conception, essence is either **abstract** or **concrete**.

Abstract essence represents the quiddity of a thing after the manner of a form, without a subject, e.g. humanity.

Concrete essence represents the quiddity of a thing as a form with its subject, e.g. man.

- 2) According to its universality or incommunicability, essence is **Individual**, **Universal**, **Absolute**.

a—Individual Essence is the essence of a thing in as far as independent of all mental consideration it exists actually or is possible of actual existence. It is nothing else than the assemblage of all the reality by which an entity is constituted this individual thing, and without which this thing could not be and by which it is always and everywhere distinct from every other thing.

Of individual essence we have no proper definition.

b—Universal Essence in its incomplete aspect is generic essence; in its complete aspect is specific essence. It is that essence which is communicable to many individuals of the same class and is found in them univocally and distributively.

c—Absolute Essence is the assemblage of constituent parts, without considering whether the essence is singular or universal.

Absolute essence is properly that which is signified by the definition.

- 3) **Physical** and **metaphysical** essence.

a—Physical essence is either constituted by a single physical reality and is said to be physically simple, e.g. God or is constituted by many realities which are really distinct and is physically composite.

The physical essence of an entity which is physically composite is constituted by the collection of all those parts and accidents which are a necessary requisite for the ex-

istence of the entity. In its stricter sense it signifies the necessary requisite of substantial parts.

b—The metaphysical essence of God is constituted by the single metaphysical reality of the Divine "Being". The metaphysical essence of the creature is constituted by the proximate genus and specific difference.

- 4) There is another division of essence.

Physical essence is the assemblage of all those perfections without which an entity can not exist. It includes not only the constituent parts whether physical or metaphysical but also all the properties and necessary faculties. Metaphysical essence is the assemblage of all those perfections without which an entity can not be conceived. It embraces nothing expressly and formally except the constituent parts.

- 5) Essence is either actual, i.e. physical in relation to its state, or merely possible, i.e. metaphysical in relation to its state. Besides this, essence can be considered absolutely as a concrete individual quiddity abstracting whether it actually exists or is in a mere state of possibility. Note: Therefore, there is a threefold way in which essence is divided into physical and metaphysical essence.

1st—according to the physical and metaphysical distinction of parts.

2nd—according to the necessity of the parts for this that the entity exist or be capable of conception.

3rd—according to the state of existence or possibility.

The Common Attributes of Essence.

68. The essences of things are immutable. The essence of everything except that of God is mutable in an improper sense; viz: inasmuch as it can begin to exist and cease to exist. Besides, every physical composite essence is mutable, in as far as it is corruptible or is capable of disintegration. Finally, every finite essence is mutable in as far as it can be the subject of accidental changes. The immutability of the

absolute essence consists in this; it can not be changed in the constituents of its essence so as to remain this essence. This immutability follows from the principle of contradiction. An essence is that by which a thing is what it is. But for a thing to be that which it is and not to have all that by which it is that which it is, would mean that the thing would at the same time be and not be what it is.

69. In the same sense and with the same restrictions, essences are said to be **indivisible**; i.e. if any constitutive factor of an essence is conceived as removed from it, we have no longer the original essence but some other.

The essences of things are **necessary**, viz. they can not not be what they are. Only one essence the Divine is physically necessary. All the others are necessarily possible, i.e. they necessarily consist of certain characteristics and while these characteristics remain, we have these essences. The essences are **contingent** in relation to actual existence, **necessary** in relation to themselves.

The essences of things are **eternal**. We understand here **negative eternity**, inasmuch as it never was and never will be repugnant for these essences to exist. They have also a **positive, ideal Eternity**, inasmuch as they have been the object of Eternal Divine Cognition.

From what has been said it is clear with what rectitude it is said that the **metaphysical** essences of things are immutable, indivisible, necessary, eternal; whilst the physical essences are contingent and temporal and if they are composite, mutable and divisible. In this distinction, physical and metaphysical essence are considered according to their state of actuality and possibility.

ARTICLE II.

On the Distinction between Essence and Existence

70. We have seen that essences are merely possible and also are existing; moreover, that in finite created essences actually existing, there must be some distinction between their essence and their existence. For the concept of essence is distinct from the concept of existence as applied to created entity. What is the nature of the distinction which is present between essence and existence in a concrete actualized entity. Over this point there has waged an age long controversy.

Illustrious men have maintained and do maintain that this distinction is and can only be a **real** one—whilst equally illustrious men hold that the distinction is only one of reason.

This controversy about the distinction between essence and existence in an actualized being can have no point as applied to God. He is uncreated, necessary, self-existent. He exists essentially by His own essence, so that in Him, essence and existence are identified. His essence is formally his existence.

71. The case is otherwise with regard to created contingent beings. The concept of a finite essence does not include the note of actual existence. If such an essence actually exists, it is caused to exist by some other being. If it were not caused to exist, it would remain a pure possibility and nothing actual. It is for this reason that we make a distinction between the essence of an actually existing contingent being and its existence. The question is what is the nature of this distinction, is it a real distinction or only one of reason?

But in this question there is no discussion of the relation of a possible essence as such to existence. The possible essences of all beings are and always were really distinct from the actualized essences which constitute the visible universe. Nor is there any question of the relation of actualized entities to their causes. However we may speak of the effect being in the cause, the effect when pursuing its own existence is really distinct from the cause. The question is of an actualized essence here and now in the visible world; is the essence a reality distinct and different from the existence antecedent to all operation of the human intellect,—or do we make this distinction as a result of an intellectual operation.

Statement of the two positions taken from Coffey's *Ontology* pg. 109 and sgs.

72. "Those who believe there is a real distinction between the essence and the existence of all actually existing contingent beings mean by this that the real essence which comes into actual existence by creation, or by the action of created causes is a reality distinct from the existence whereby it actually exists. The actually existing essence is the total term of the creative or productive act; but what we apprehend in it under the concept of essence is really distinct from

what we apprehend in it under the concept of existence, the existence being a real principle which actualises the essence, and this latter being in itself another real principle which is in itself a positive, subjective potentiality of existence. Neither of course can actually exist without the other; no actual existence except that of a real essence; no essence except by reason of the existence which makes it actual. But those two real principles of existing contingent being, inseparable as they are and correlative, are nevertheless distinct realities, distinct in the objective order and independently of our thought, and form by their union a really composite product, the existing thing".

Note: This opinion is supported by the Thomists and by the Dominicans in general with some exceptions.

73. The second opinion:

"According to this view, the essence and existence of any existing contingent being are one and the same reality. There is however in this reality a basis for the two distinct objective concepts—of essence and existence—whereby we apprehend it. For the contingent being does not exist necessarily; we see such beings coming into existence and ceasing to exist; we can therefore think of what they are without thinking of them as actually existent; in other words we can think of them as possible and of their existence as that by which they become actual. This is a sufficient reason for distinguishing mentally in the existing being, the essence which exists and the existence by which it exists. But when we think of the essence of an actually existing being as objectively possible, or as potential in its causes, we are no longer thinking of it as anything real in itself but only of its ideal being as an object of the thought in our minds, or of the ideal being it has in the Divine mind, or of the potential being it has in created causes, or of the virtual being it has in the Divine Omnipotence, or of the ultimate basis of its possibility in the Divine Essence. But all these modes of "being" we know to be really distinct from the real contingent essence itself which begins to exist actually in time and may cease once more to exist in time when and if its own nature demands, and God wills, such cessation. But that the real, contingent essence itself which so exists, is something really distinct from the existence whereby it exists; that it forms with the latter a really composite being; that it is in

itself a real subjective, potentiality, receptive of existence as another and actualising reality, really distinct from it, so that the creation or production of any single actually existing contingent being would have for its term two really distinct principles of being, a potential and an actual essence and existence created or produced *per modum unius* so to speak; for asserting all this it is contended by supporters of the virtual distinction that we have no justifying reason."

Note: The defenders of this view are the Scotists, Suarez and the Jesuits, generally, with some exceptions.

ARTICLE III.

The Possibles

74. The consideration of the possibles in themselves or in their formal entity.

A possible in general is that which is capable of existence or an entity whose act or existence includes no repugnance. Understood in this sense, a possible embraces those things which actually exist whether necessarily or contingently and is the same as "being".

In its strict sense—a possible or "merely possible" embraces those things *alone* which *can* exist, though actually they do not. It is about the "merely Possibles" that this article treats.

There is a twofold possibility—intrinsic and extrinsic. **Intrinsic** possibility is the capacity of a thing to exist—which arises from the fact that its constituent notes are not repugnant.

Extrinsic possibility is the capacity of a thing to exist arising from the fact that there is a cause capable of reducing the thing to its act or of giving it existence.

Adequate possibility is the capacity of a thing to exist arising from the combination of intrinsic and extrinsic possibility.

To this twofold possibility there corresponds a twofold impossibility—intrinsic founded on the repugnance of constitutive notes, and extrinsic founded on the absence of a cause capable of reducing a thing to its act or existence.

A thing **intrinsically** possible can be considered under a twofold aspect—**formally** and **fundamentally**.

A possible **considered formally** is looked at according to its own intrinsic reality, which is the **entity** itself, which can be actualized.

A possible **considered fundamentally**, is a possible looked at in its foundation, which is the Divine Essence.

We develop our doctrine with regard to the possibles considered in themselves or **formally** in two propositions.

Proposition I.

The Possibles Have No Actual Internal Reality

75. In this proposition we deny that the formal possibles have any internal actuality i.e., an act however diminished and incomplete in opposition to a reality merely ideal. The opposite opinion is attributed to Henry of Ghent.

Proof of the Proposition

If the possibles have some diminished actuality of being, they would have it either in virtue of their own essence or from God.

But neither supposition is true. Therefore, the possibles have no actual internal reality.

Proof of the Minor

1st Part. If the possibles in virtue of their own essence had any diminished actuality of being, they would be of infinite perfection, for a being existing in virtue of its own essence is God, as will be proved elsewhere. But the possibles are evidently of limited perfection, therefore they have no diminished actuality in virtue of their own essence.

2nd Part. If the possibles had any actuality from God, they would have it as a result of a physical emanation from God or by production from nothing. But the first supposition is absurd. In the second supposition, the question is relative to the possibles before production. Antecedent to production, they were either possible or not; if the second alternative were true, they could not be produced—if the first alternative were true, the question returns and so on "ad infinitum".

N.B. For a fuller explanation of this peculiar doctrine De Wolf—History of Medieval Philosophy. Coffey's Ontology pp. 86-88.

Proposition II.

76. The possibles are not altogether nothing but are rightly said to consist in something positive which is metaphysical or negligible.

Since the possibles have not internal actuality some philosophers have said that they are altogether nothing. This followed from the fundamental assumption that the actual alone is **real**, that the purely possible essence is nothing real and is impossible. This doctrine is founded on the fatalistic necessity of the actual. It involves the denial of all real becoming or change, implicitly asserts that all actuality is eternal—and hence is in conflict with the Theistic truths relating to the Divine Omnipotence and Freedom in creation.

The sense of the thesis is that possible essences are not absolutely nothing, for they are intelligible and are distinguishable one from the other. They are **nothing** relative to **existence**, but are something as essences. Nor are they merely **entities of reasons**, for the latter cannot be contemplated as existing apart from the mind in the world of actuality; whilst the possibles are precisely essences which can be exterminated by the actuality of existence.

Proof.

77. The possible 1-o can be conceived by the intellect with a concept which is positive proper and independent of the concept of another thing as an element of itself: 2-o can receive the act of existence. But that which is absolutely nothing i.e. which has neither actuality nor objective or subjective potency—this cannot be so conceived by the intellect and cannot be actualized—therefore the possibles are not altogether nothing.

Major 1-o If I conceive a possible v.g. animal—I do not conceive it through something else but through itself, nor do I in conceiving it conceive nothing. 2-o This is clear from the definition of the possible.

Minor 1-o Absolute nothing is conceived through the negation of something. 2-o cannot create absolute nothing.

(78) **Corollary I.** That the possibles are not merely entities of reason is clear from the fact that they can be actualized.

Corollary II. The Fatalists and Pantheists are wrong in asserting that the possibles are those things alone which in

the course of time are actualized and the merely possibles are impossible. Since God is free in his external operations, it is not necessary that all things which can be, should be actualized.

Corollary III. If it be asked **where** are these metaphysical realities called possibles, we deny the supposition. That which is not actual is not localized but is solely objective in the intellect.

79. Scholion. **Metaphysical** is used in opposition to the **Physical** in a triple sense.

A.—By reason of **cognoscibility** those entities are called “metaphysical” which are not subject to the sense—but are attained by reason alone.

B.—By reason of **distinction**—if the distinction is real—the parts are **physical**; if the distinction is of reason with a perfect foundation in actuality, the parts are **metaphysical**.

C.—By reason of **state**, that is said to be physical which actually exists in the order of nature; that is said to be metaphysical which only exists objectively in the ideal order in such wise that it has the potency of being actualized.

ON THE ORIGIN AND FOUNDATION OF POSSIBILITY AND THE POSSIBLES.

A Rejection of False Theories.

THESIS VII.

The internal possibility of things does not depend on the Divine Potency.

80. Divine Potency is understood “formally” i.e. the Omnipotence in as far as it is formally distinguished from the Divine Essence, which is really and radically the Divine Omnipotence.

William of Occam (1347) is the main advocate of this Erroneous Doctrine. It is not his idea that God **efficaciously** causes intrinsic possibility, but ignoring all intrinsic possibility, he recalls the capacity which a thing has to exist to the **Effective** power of God. Things are according to him intrinsically possible, because God can create them.

"The ultimate source of the extrinsic possibility of all contingent realities is the Divine Omnipotence; just as the proximate source of the intrinsic possibility of a statue is the power of the sculptor to educe it from the block of marble or wood. But just as the power of the sculptor presupposes the intrinsic possibility of the statue, so does the Divine Omnipotence presuppose the intrinsic possibility of all possible things." Coffey—Ontology Pg. 95.

Proof of the Thesis.

81. If a thing were possible because God could produce it, it would be impossible because God could not produce it.

But this is absurd. Therefore, things are not possible because God can produce them.

The Major is evident.

Proof of the Minor. If lack of power in God were the reason why a thing were impossible, His power would be limited. But God's power is unlimited. Therefore, the lack of power in God is not the cause of the impossibility of a thing. In other words things would be impossible not because they were unable to be the terms, of Divine action, but because the Divine Potency could not extend itself to them.

82. **Corollary I.** Therefore extrinsic possibility is not to be confounded with adequate possibility. Intrinsic possibility is independent of the Divine Potency formally considered. Extrinsic possibility is a result of Divine Potency and depends upon it.

Corollary II. It is better to say the impossibles cannot be than to say that God cannot produce them.

Difficulties

83. 1. A possible is that which can exist. But nothing can exist except through the Divine Potency.

2. The aptitude of a creature to exist cannot be without dependence on something else. That which depends for existence on something else, depends on the Potency of this entity.

Therefore the possibles depend on the Divine Potency.

3. If Omnipotence presupposes the internal possibility of a thing, God would be in need of something before creation. But this is absurd.

THESIS VIII.

The internal possibility of things does not depend on the free will of God.

(84) The false doctrine refuted in this thesis is the **voluntaristic** theory of Descartes, according to which all possibility and impossibility is determined by the free will of God. Thus Descartes says that the sole reason why the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles is the will of God. All necessity, then, is hypothetic and consequent upon the Divine Will. It was a false notion of what is necessary for the Free Will of God which seems to have caused this theory of Descartes. It is not necessary to save the supremacy of the Divine Will by advancing a principle which would overturn the necessity of the metaphysical order and render all human knowledge impossible. The Divine Will is dependent, according to our way of conceiving it, upon the Divine Intellect, which is in turn dependent upon the Divine Essence, as its object of thought. The Possibles being at least radicated in the Divine Essence antecede the Divine Potency and hence are **formally** not dependent upon it.

Proof.

85. If internal possibility were dependent on the Divine Free Will, the Divine Intellect would likewise be dependent on it.

But this is repugnant. Therefore, internal possibility is not dependent on the Divine Free Will.

Major. The Intellect does not make its object but presupposes it. Before the making of the possibles through the Free Will of God, there would be no intelligible object of the Divine Intellect with regard to contingent things. Hence the Divine Intellect would depend on the Divine Will.

Minor. The Will is dependent on the intellect to guide its activity. Therefore the intellect ought to first apprehend the order of the good and the true before the will can wish it.

Note: For a development of this proof and a response to the main difficulty of Descartes—Confer Coffey—Pg. 97.

Difficulties.

86. 1. God is free with regard to external creation.—But the Possibles are an object extrinsic to God. Therefore, the possibles depend on the Divine Free Will.

2. A possible is that which can exist. But nothing can exist except God freely will it. Therefore, the possibles are dependent on the Divine Free Will.

3. It is metaphysically repugnant for a thing to exist independent of God's volition. But that the existence of which is metaphysically repugnant is intrinsically impossible. Therefore, intrinsic impossibility depends on the Divine Volition and so intrinsic possibility.

B. TRUE DOCTRINE ON THE ORIGIN AND FOUNDATION OF THE POSSIBLES.

THESIS IX.

Intrinsic possibility or impossibility is immediately constituted by the essences of things.

87. In this thesis there is question of the intrinsic constitution of the possible or of that **formal** principle by reason of which some things are intrinsically possible, others not so. There is a great difference between these two ideas, viz. to be the first **foundation** of all reality and to be the **intrinsic constitutive** principle of a thing. Man is constituted of body and soul and immediately and formally originates from the union of soul and body, although soul and body are from God as the ultimate extrinsic cause.

It is our contention that the **formal** and **constitutive** reason of possibility and impossibility are the essences of things i.e., their essential elements.

Proof.

88. Intrinsic possibility consists in the **sociability** of the notes of a thing.

But this sociability immediately arises from the essence of a thing. Therefore, intrinsic possibility is immediately constituted by the essences of things.

Minor. Notes are sociable because they are not nothing and because they are such notes. If they were nothing, the totality would be nothing; if they were not **such** notes, they might be unassociable. But the "**suchness**" of the notes arises from the essence of the thing.

Explanation. "Man" is intrinsically possible, because first a spiritual soul is possible which can be the form of the

body, and secondly matter is possible which can be informed and be the subject of sensitive and vegetable life. The intrinsic possibility of an entity immediately arises from the fact that all its notes can and do harmonize. But all the notes of a thing constitute its essence. Therefore the intrinsic possibility of a thing immediately arises from its essence.

89. Corollary I. Therefore intrinsic possibility is rightly said to consist in the sociability of notes. For all essence is conceived to consist of a certain number of notes, which when assembled in the identity of one subject constitute no repugnance. The simple notes are possible because besides the simple note which implies being there is no other which under the same respect implies non-being.

Corollary II. Therefore **intrinsic possibility** is immutable. For essences are immutable and consequently the relations of notes constituting these essences are equally so. The characteristics of **eternity** and **necessity** apply to intrinsic possibility in the same way that they apply to essences.

THESIS X.

The ultimate and extrinsic principle of intrinsic possibility is good.

90. We have just shown that the possibles are such intrinsically and immediately by virtue of their own essence. The question now arises, is this **intrinsic** constitution of the possible altogether independent of any extrinsic principle? In other words essences are "per se" possible are they "a se" possible? To this question we answer that the ultimate extrinsic principle of possibility is God. This thesis is advanced against Wolff, Storchenau and others who contend that in the absurd hypothesis of the non-existence of God, essences would remain intrinsically possible.

Proof.

91. If possibility were not ultimately dependent upon God—God would not be infinitely perfect. But God is infinitely perfect—Therefore, possibility is ultimately dependent on God.

Major. Since God cannot create anything except it be intrinsically possible,—if possibility did not depend upon God,

He would require for all His external activity a complement independent of Himself and extrinsic to Himself and He would be truly dependent on the intrinsic possibility of things.

92. Corollary I. Therefore in the absurd hypothesis of the non-existence of God, nothing would be possible. On the other hand nothing would be impossible, for contradiction is between reality and non-reality. But by the removal of all physical and metaphysical reality, no reality would be intelligible, hence non-reality would have no opposite.

THESIS XI.

The ultimate principle and ontological source of all intrinsic possibility is the Divine Essence alone. The possibles are rightly said to depend on the Divine Intellect in as far as they are not constituted formally in the ideal order except through divine cognition.

(93) In the preceding thesis, we have shown that the possibles are ultimately and extrinsically dependent on God. In this thesis we are investigating the specific character of this dependence. There are various opinions. Some teach that the possibles formally considered depend **proximately** upon the Divine Intellect and remotely and **ultimately** upon the Divine Essence. Thus Liberatore, Palmieri, La Housse, Harper, T. Pesch, Lessius, Suarez.

Others say that the possibles depend solely upon the **Divine Essence** and not at all upon the **Divine Intellect**. According to this opinion the possibles formally considered are antecedent to the Divine Intellect, which presupposes them as Its object and term. Thus Schiffini, Mendive, Hontheim, Urraburu.

Our answer is a distinction. In the first part of the thesis we show in what sense the possibles are founded on the Divine Essence alone; in the second part, we show in what way they depend on the **Divine Intellect**.

94. The thesis has two parts.

A. In the first we prove that intrinsic possibility has its ontological source **solely** in the Divine Essence. The ontological source of the possibles is the reason why they are intrinsically possible. To ask the ultimate source of the possible is nothing else than to seek the answer we would give

to one asking why ultimately some essences are possible, other essences impossible. To this question we answer, the ultimate source of all possibility is **solely** the infinite **Divine Essence** in as far as it is imitable by entities distinct from itself.

B. In the second part we investigate whether and in what way the possibles depend upon the Divine Intellect. From the first part it will be apparent that the Divine Intellect is in no way the reason of the intrinsic possibility of essences. But since many authors assert that the possibles in a very special manner have a relation to the Divine Intellect which they have not to the Divine Will or Omnipotence, we inquire in what sense this can be correctly understood. We answer that the possibles depend upon the Divine Intellect in as far as they have no actual objective or ideal "being" according to their formal characteristics except in as far as they are the objects of the Divine Cognition, and thus obtain in the Divine Intellect an object ideal being.

Part I. Proof.

95. The ultimate principles and ontological source of all intrinsic possibility is the Divine Essence.

If the Divine Essence **alone** contains all the perfections of creatures either formally or virtually or eminently, then all the perfections of creatures and hence their intrinsic possibility depends upon the Divine Essence alone.

But the Divine Essence does contain all the perfections of creatures, either formally or virtually or eminently. Therefore, intrinsic possibility depends on the Divine Essence alone.

Major. It is in virtue of the Divine Essence that God is **actuality** itself or the infinite plenitude of being. Consequently God by His Essence contains all the perfections even of things distinct from His Essence. Hence there is no being nor perfection of being which is not included in the Divine Essence. What is not included in the Divine Essence is simply **nothing**, what is included is so far **something** in as much as by participation, it imitates the Divine Essence and consequently in its concept includes dependence on the Divine Essence as imitable.

Part II.

The possibles depend on the Divine Intellect in as far as

they are not constituted formally in the ideal order except through the Divine Cognition.

Proof

96. According to our way of conceiving things, antecedent to the Divine Intellect knowing the Divine Essence, there could be nothing except the Divine Essence and whatsoever is in it as an essence.

But in the Divine Essence—1o the possibles could not have a "formal being" and 2o—from the very fact that the Divine Intellect knows the Divine Essence, the possibles would necessarily have "formal objective being". Therefore, the possibles are formally constituted in the ideal order through the Divine Intellect.

Minor 1o—The possibles are not formally in Divine Essence—for they would be identified with it—and God would be formally e.g. material.

Minor 2o—Just as the created intellect when it knows perfectly a cause, knows also the effect which is contained virtually only and not formally in it, and in knowing it does so according to the "formal being" it has distinct from the cause, and thus through cognition gives to the effect an ideal objective being, so too, the Divine Intellect contemplating the Divine Essence understands the possible modes of its imitability, and expresses these modes in the Divine Intellect according to their formal entity and thus gives them "formal objective ideal being."

Scholion—Cf. Coffey—Pgs. 84-100—Rickaby Pgs. 166-188.

Chapter III.

THE TRANSCENDENTAL QUALITIES OF BEING.

97. The transcendental qualities of being are unity, truth and goodness. These superadd something to the notion of being and it is not tautological to say e.g. being is good or being is true. Nevertheless these three attributes are as extensive in their application as the notion of being itself, for as we shall see all being is one and true and good.

98. That there are no other such attributes of being is thus proved after the mind of St. Thomas. The attributes of being must superadd something to the notion of being.

Since this cannot be something really distinct, it is either a negation or an extrinsic denomination. By the first is formed the unity of being, which is the negation of division in itself. By the second is formed the truth of being, which consists in a relation to the intellect, and the goodness of being, which consists in a relation to the will. There is no other faculty which has a reference to being in itself. Hence this chapter is divided into three articles:

1. The unity of being.
2. The truth of being.
3. The goodness of being.

ARTICLE I.

THE UNITY OF BEING.

I. The Definition

99. One is that which is undivided in itself. For a thing is said to be one when actually it is not divided into many; in as far as something is divided, it is not said to be one. Unity is, therefore, INDIVISION or the NEGATION OF DIVISION.

Although unity is explained by us through a negation, it is, nevertheless, something positive, viz., a perfection by which being is so restricted in itself that it is not many.

For a clearer understanding of this definition three things are worthy of note:

a) ONE does not mean INDIVISIBLE. There are many things which are actually not divided and which, however, are capable of division.

b) ONE is not the same as UNIQUE. One denies division; unique denies the participation of any other entity in the same genus. Hence unity is not unicity.

c) Unity is not the same as union. Union, which is the cohesion of many, presupposes many. This is not the case with unity.

2. Division

100. SIMPLE AND COMPOSITE ONENESS.

A simple ONE is undivided and indivisible; a composite

ONE is undivided and divisible. The first is undivided actually and potentially: the second however is undivided only potentially.

101. SIMPLE AND ACCIDENTAL UNITY.

a) ONE "per se" or "simpliciter" is whatever has all those things and only those things which are a natural postulate for the possibility of its complete existence.

Such a ONE can be simple or composite. For a composite entity to have such unity, no part of the composite ought to have a complete nature but the single parts ought to be ordered for the formation of one complete nature. Thus the body and the soul of man are incomplete in themselves, for they have a natural ordination to intrinsically constitute the specific nature of man.

b) ONE "per accidens" can be understood in a twofold sense;

a. a substance naturally united to its accidents.

b. that which is in reality many but said to be one by reason of some unifying circumstance.

Thus we have the **Unity of Aggregation**, formed by the contiguity of many in the same place, e.g. a heap of stones; **MORAL UNITY** formed by some moral or juridical link which unites rational beings, e.g., a family, the state; **ARTIFICIAL UNITY** formed by the union of many elements for something extrinsic to each; e.g. a watch, a machine.

102. 3. Universal, formal and singular unity. A **universal one** is one thing which has an aptitude to inexist in many things and to be predicable of many. This unity has a twofold implication; a) actual indivision, b) communicability or division with regard to many inferiors.

FORMAL ONE is one essence in as far as it is indivisible into many essences. This unity prescind from communicability or incommunicability. A **singular one** is one which is incommunicable to many inferiors. This unity implies two things; a) actual indivision, b) incommunicability. Note: Universal unity is logical, for it is the result of an operation of the mind. Singular unity is real. Formal unity is real with regard to that which is expressed, but it is not real with regard to the abstract manner in which it is expressed.

I. EVERY ENTITY IS ONE.

This assertion is proved in the following manner according to the mind of St. Thomas. (I, qu. II. a. I.). "Every entity is either simple or composite. That which is simple is undivided actually and potentially. That which is composite has no being as long as its parts are divided, but only when they constitute the composite itself. Hence it is clear that the being of any thing consists in indivision".

2. EVERY EXISTING ENTITY IS SINGULAR.

This proposition is self evident but it can be proved indirectly thus: If A existing were not singular, it would be many, i.e. it would be A and it would not be A. But nothing can be and not be at the same time. Therefore A existing is singular. Cf. Suarez, Met. Disp. 5, s. I.

3. THE SINGULARITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL IS NOT REALLY DISTINCT FROM ITS SPECIFIC NATURE.

Singularity or **thisness** is the quality by which something is this nature and not some other. We contend that this quality is really identified with nature itself.

For:

If my human nature were not of itself different from yours but only by something really distinct, my human nature would not be different from yours. For whatever of itself is the same as something else, always remains the same no matter what is added to it.

But my human nature is really distinct from yours.

Therefore my human nature is of itself different from yours. Therefore that by which my human nature is mine, is really identified with my human nature.

104. Multitude and Number.

MULTITUDE is division or plurality, just as unity is indivision. MANY are said to be those things which are divided, the one from the other.

MULTITUDE is potential only or imperfect if the many are really distinct though united (e.g. the parts in a continuum); it is actual or perfect if the many are really separated.

NUMBER is multitude measured by one. The notion of number adds two things to the notion of multitude; a) some similitude amongst the many or logical unity; otherwise they could not be measured by the one; b) the relation to mensuration.

105. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTIONS IDENTITY AND SIMILITUDE.

IDENTITY is the affirmability of one thing of the other "in recto". For we have identity when we can say "This is that" e.g. Peter is a man. "In recto" is added, for those things which are asserted "in obliquo" are not necessarily identical (e.g. Peter is a creature of God). You will say that wherever there is one thing and the other, there can be no identity. Therefore, the definition is defective. The objection has weight if the one thing and the other are such "a parte rei" but is invalid if they are such as the result of a mental distinction. For our concept of identity originates thus: we conceive the one thing twice and after a comparison of the two concepts perceive that they express the same thing.

Therefore **FUNDAMENTALLY** identity is unity; **FORMALLY** identity is a relation. This relation is certainly a logical one, for a relation implies opposition and nothing can be really opposed to itself.

Note: "A parte rei", identity is prior to distinction, just as one is prior to multitude. But our concept of identity is subsequent to our concept of distinction. For we conceive some things as identical only after we have first distinguished them and then denied the distinction.

Identity is **PHYSICAL** or **MORAL**. Physical identity is the actual permanence of the same thing, e.g. God, the soul. We have **MORAL** identity when some reality, although it is physically changed, nevertheless remains the same in the estimation of men, e.g. the human body. The basis of this estimation is that the change takes place very gradually and imperceptibly. **SIMILITUDE** is agreement of many things in the same objective concept. Thus two white objects agree in the one concept of whiteness. If the objective concept expresses the essence complete or incomplete of the similar things, the relation is called **LOGICAL IDENTITY**. If the

concept expresses QUALITY the relation is called Similitude in the strict sense. If the concept expresses quantity, the relation is called equality. Therefore, if we compare identity and similitude, the following is evident: a) Things which are identical are one; things which are similar are many. b) Similitude is a real relation; identity is a relation of reason.

106. DISTINCTION AND DIVERSITY.

Distinction is the negation of identity, or the ability to deny one thing of another "in recto". Just as identity is expressed by saying: "This is that"; so distinction is expressed by saying "This is not that". Hence distinct things are those of which one is not the other.

DIVERSITY is the negation of similitude. To be DISTINCT, to be DIFFERENT, to be DIVERSE are not synonymous with the philosophers. To be distinct is not to be the same; to be different is to be similar in one thing but to be distinct in another; to be diverse is not to be similar.

107. DIVISIONS OF DISTINCTION.

REAL DISTINCTION is found amongst those things which are not the same, independent of all mental operation.

LOGICAL DISTINCTION takes place amongst those things which are really the same, but which correspond to diverse objective concepts. A distinction of reason is not so called because it takes place between entities of reason but because it CONCEIVES as distinct, things which are not so. There is nothing false in such a conception, because it is not said to be a real distinction. The adequateness of this division is evident, between "to be really the same" and "not to be really the same", there can be no middle position.

REAL DISTINCTION IS TWOFOLD:

a) Positive and Negative. The positive takes place between positive entities. If both or either one of the extremes are negatives or an entities of reason, the distinction is called negative.

b) Major and Minor distinction. The first takes place between two complete entities; the latter between an entity and its mode.

108. A distinction of reason is either "RATIOCINANTIS" or "RATIOCINATAE", ACCORDING AS IT TAKES PLACE BETWEEN TWO CONCEPTS FORMALLY IDENTICAL OR BETWEEN TWO CONCEPTS

FORMALLY NOT IDENTICAL. The first is said to be without a foundation in reality; the second is said to be with a foundation in reality.

THE FOUNDATION OF THE DISTINCTION IN REALITY, IS THE OBJECTIVE REASON IN VIRTUE OF WHICH THE DISTINCTION IS MADE. This reason can be threefold;

a) Equivalence. One entity can contain many perfections which are univocally contained in other but separate entities. Thus man is animal, rational, living. Life is contained in the brute but without rationality; it is contained also in the plant but without animality and rationality.

b) Eminence. One perfection which cannot be adequately represented by us with one concept is understood by many inadequate concepts. Thus the essence of God.

c) The diverse intellegibility of a thing with regard to the various things connoted by it. Thus being under different aspects is one, true, good.

The foundation is PERFECT or IMPERFECT according as the higher concept prescinds perfectly or imperfectly from the lower. Thus "body" can be perfectly conceived without life: for it can exist without life. But the single attributes of God cannot be conceived perfectly without conceiving the totality of God. Being cannot be perfectly conceived without conceiving its modes.

109. THE PRINCIPLE SIGNS OF REAL DISTINCTION.

The principle signs of a real distinction are three: **separability**, the **origin** of one thing from another, **opposition**.

SEPARABILITY. If one thing is separated from another, after separation there are three possibilities; both entities can persist in being, e.g. the trunk and branches of a tree, or neither can persist, e.g. matter and a non-subsistent form, or one can persist and the other not, as Paul and this particular posture.

THE ORIGIN OF ONE THING FROM ANOTHER, i.e. through real procession.

OPPOSITION OF WHATEVER KIND, whether it be contradictory or contrary or privative or relative. Since all opposition is founded on the opposition of contradiction, all opposition is reducible to this. Two things, therefore, are really distinct when their objective concepts are constituted by repugnant notes.

This sign is not to be applied unless the predicates which and as far as they are contradictory apply to the thing antecedent to the operation of the mind. It can happen that the contradiction arises after and because of an operation of the mind. Such a contradiction is not to be applied to the thing. Therefore it is to be noted that a contradiction is not present unless the same predicate is affirmed and denied under the same aspect. Thus the same person can be father and son, the same road can lead to a place and away from it, the same point can be the beginning and the end of a line.

110. Therefore the trunk and branches of a tree, the soul and the body are really distinct, for they can be separated. Also there is a real distinction between the intellect and its act, for the one arises from the other. Finally Pantheism is refuted, for if it were true, then contradictory predicates would be applicable to the same thing.

Although all things which are actually separable are distinct, it can not be said that things which are actually inseparable are identical. Nor is it licit to conclude from a real distinction to separability. The three Divine persons are really distinct but are not separable.

ARTICLE II.

THE TRUTH OF BEING.

111. We have seen the nature of logical truth or the truth of cognition. Judgments are said to be true, if they are conformed to things; those judgments are said to be false which are in positive difformity with things.

Daily use teaches us that not only cognitions but also things are said to be true. This is true gold; this is a true gem; this is a true friend. Likewise also we attribute a certain falsity to things; we speak of false gold, of false friends, of false money.

If we ask ourselves what meaning we attach to "true" and "false" in this connection we notice that we apply these terms to things in proportion as they are in conformity or out of conformity with our concept of these things. Why do we call this stone a true gem? Because we see that it corresponds to our concept of a gem.

Whom do we call a true friend? Only him who corresponds to the definition of friend, which we have in our mind. On the other hand we call a false friend him who is lacking in the idea which we have of a friend. Therefore the truth of a thing, which is called ONTOLOGICAL, consists in the CONFORMITY OF A THING WITH THE INTELLECT. Similarly the ontological falsity of a thing consists in its lack of conformity with the intellect.

112. But this norm is entirely subjective and things cannot continuously begin and cease to be true. Therefore conformity with our intellect cannot be the essential element of ontological truth. What intellect is, therefore, signified? We answer that things are ontologically true because and as far as they are conformed to the Divine Intellect. For God understands what things ought to be and all creatures are made according to the Divine ideas. Since then an artificial thing is said to be true which is elaborated according to the idea of the artificer, so all creatures are said to be ontologically true, because and as far as they are made according to the Divine exemplary ideas. Therefore the verity of things consists essentially and ultimately in their conformity to the Divine Intellect. You will urge that artificial things (e.g. a watch) ultimately depend on the human intellect and so the truth of things cannot consist in conformity with the Divine Intellect. The objection has no weight with regard to the simple essences of things. With regard to their artificial essence they depend **proximately** on the human intellect but **ultimately** on the Divine, for the intellect of the artificer depends on the Divine Intellect. It is also urged that when we think of the ontological truth of things we do not think of the Divine intellect. The objection is valid, if our concept of the thing is inadequate but an adequate concept of anything involves its dependence on the Divine Intellect.

113. It is precisely because things are conformed to the intellect that they are intelligible. On the impossible supposition that there are somethings which are conformed to no intellect, they would not be intelligible. My watch is the product of an intelligent artificer, hence it is intelligible. A line is said to be a parabola, if it has the characteristics of such a curve and is thus intelligible to others. The lines which children make in the sands are not made according to any characteristics and hence are not intelligible; for they

are not made under the guidance of the intellect and hence are nothing.

This INTELLIGIBILITY OF THINGS is also called ONTOLOGICAL TRUTH.

114. Our intellect also is made according to the Divine intellect. This word "according" here can be taken in a double sense; a) in as far as the Divine Intellect contains the exemplary idea of our intellect; b) in as far as our intellect is an image of the Divine Intellect itself. The second is founded on the first. The exemplary idea of any intellect is necessarily an imitation of the Divine Intellect. But the Divine Intellect certainly understands things. Therefore our intellect can understand them in some way. This is the ontological foundation for the aptitude of our minds with regard to knowledge.

115. ALL BEING IS TRUE.

Ontological truth is the conformity of a thing with the intellect or the intelligibility of the thing.

Therefore all being is true.

As to the minor. The Divine Essence is conformed to the Divine Intellect for it is identical with it. All creatures are in conformity with the Exemplary ideas of God. Therefore all being is in conformity at least with Divine Intellect. Besides, whatever is in conformity with some intellect is intelligible. Since all being is in conformity with some intellect, all being is intelligible.

Note: It may be objected that the existence of God and His attributes have not yet been established. This is true but we can rightly assume these things, for they will afterwards be proved, and independently of whatever is said here.

ALL THAT WHICH IS TRUE IS BEING.

116. Being is that which exists or can exist; that which neither exists nor can exist is not being.

But whatever is conformed to some intellect and is intelligible exists or at least can exist.

Therefore all that which is true is being.

ONTOLOGICAL FALSITY

117. Falsity is opposed to truth. Since everything is ontologically true at least with regard to the Divine Intellect, it follows that nothing is ontologically false. Nevertheless

certain things are said by us to be false, viz. with regard to our intellect. This happens in a twofold way:

1. Natural things are said to be false in as far as they appear to us other than they are and thus furnish the occasion of error. Thus a certain mineral is called false gold because it has the appearance of gold.

2. Artificial things are said to be simply false in as far as they are out of conformity with the intellect of the artificer. In this sense we speak of a false note in music, a false line in architecture. But these things might better be called defective, since they do not happen according to rule.

ARTICLE III.

118. THE GOODNESS OF BEING.

There remains the third property of being, viz. goodness. We shall treat first of all of the good and then of its opposite, evil. There are certain notions bordering on the notion of the good, viz. those of PERFECTION, ORDER AND BEAUTY which we will not treat here. That there is such a thing as the "good" is evident from experience. We seek good, talk of good, fly from its opposite. The notion of the good is altogether simple and hence cannot be strictly defined. It can be declared by a consideration of its effects or properties and amplified by other concepts which are in reality not better known than the concept of good but seem to be.

119. DEFINITION

Good in the concrete has been defined "a posteriori" by Aristotle thus: "id quod omnia appetunt". This might be translated "The good is that for which all things have an appetite". With regard to this definition, which Aristotle received from the Ancients, it is worthy of note that:

a) There is no intention to describe some one good towards which all things tend; nor does the definition mean that each and every good is sought by all; nor are those things alone said to be good which are ACTUALLY desired; for it is sufficient that a thing can be the object of desire to make it good. Hence the definition implies that the good is whatever has APPETIBILITY or in other words nothing is desirable or appetible save what is good. You may argue that there are some who desire evil, as suicides who seek death. To this St. Thomas would answer that they do not seek evil

except in so far as it has the appearance of good, and thus their intention by its very nature is born towards the good though by accident it results in what is evil.

b) To have an APPETITE is to tend towards something as an end. In its primary sense it has application to the rational will, thus we are said to have an appetite, a desire for learning. In its less strict sense it applies to every appetite, both those that are conjoined with cognition; thus we say the dog has an appetite for the outstretched bone and the plant for water. In its widest sense APPETITE means any inclination and capacity, thus the Scholastics say potency has an appetite for its act, matter has an appetite for some form. In the definition appetite is intended in its widest sense.

That this definition is good is evident. When we strive to persuade some one to some line of endeavor, we point out to him the goodness and the desirability of the project. It is equally evident that we can never have an appetite or a desire for evil as such, but if we seek something evil it is always under the semblance of a good.

The definition is not essential but is drawn from a consideration of the effect peculiar to what is good. Something is desirable because it is good and not vice-versa. On the other hand goodness is not dependent upon either the actual or possible appetite for itself. For things are not called good because they are desired. In other words the goodness of things is not a purely subjective quality after the mind of Herbart and Munsterberg.

Note: The appetite is often called an END. Hence GOOD and END are identified by Aristotle. They have however, a formal difference. For GOOD is the foundation of the END; the END has the power of moving for its attainment precisely because it is GOOD.

120. Thus far the "a posteriori" definition of good. "A PRIORI", good in the concrete is defined: "A PERFECTION SUITABLE TO SOMETHING". PERFECTION is that by which something is and is said to be perfect. A thing is PERFECT if it is lacking in none of those things which are due to it. But even the most minute SINGLE degrees of reality which render a thing perfect are called —PERFECTIONS. In this ultimate sense the word PERFECTION IS UNDERSTOOD in the definition.

A perfection is said to be **SUITABLE IN AS FAR AS IT HAS CAPACITY** to fulfill the inclination, appetite, desire of the thing of which it is said to be a perfection. Therefore the perfection itself is not the goodness of the thing but the foundation of goodness. Goodness **FORMALLY** consists in the relation of suitability.

That this is a good definition is evident. The attempt to persuade some one to a line of activity finds us pointing out the suitability of the thing, its ability to satisfy some capacity or inclination. Therefore Locke, Spencer, Paulsen give a poor definition of good when they define it as that which contributes to prosperity or delectation. The Psychologists are equally unhappy in their definition when they describe the good as that which excites in us esthetic, religious, social sentiments.

121. DIVISIONS OF THE GOOD.

TRUE AND APPARENT GOOD.

True good is that which is such as it seems to be, i.e., it is really good and proper to the one seeking it. Thus virtue is a true good for man.

Apparent good is not that which it seems to be, i.e., either it is not a good, as suicide, or it is not a proper good for the one who seeks it, as riches for man.

GOOD FOR ONESELF AND GOOD FOR ANOTHER

Good for oneself (*bonum sibi*) is a perfection suitable to one's own nature. Good for another (*bonum alteri*) is a perfection suitable to some other nature.

HONORABLE — DELECTABLE — USEFUL — GOOD

A thing is appetible either on account of itself or on account of something else which is connected with it. That which is appetible on account of something else, is called a useful good, as medicine is desired on account of health. That which is appetible for itself, is so, either on account of the quietude experienced by the appetite in possessing it and is then called a delectable good, or on account of the perfection it brings to the nature of the one desiring it and then is called an honorable good.

Note 1: As St. Thomas observes, in this division the things themselves are not divided, as if one thing were a honorable good and another delectable and still another use-

ful, but by these divisions are enumerated the three different aspects under which a thing may be sought. The very same thing, as knowledge, can be sought either because it perfects nature as such, or because it is delectable, or because it is useful. Nor is it the sense that these three aspects are found in each and every thing but that simply these aspects are found in things.

Note 2: The members of this division are analogous. In the proper sense only honorable good is good, for it alone perfects the nature of the one seeking it. The delectable is a good formally, for it can be desired for itself. But it is ordered by its very nature to the honorable good and is as it were the flavor of this good. Useful good is such by an extrinsic analogy. It is not appetible except by reason of the relation it has either to honorable or delectable good.

Note 3: The word honorable is given as an imperfect translation of the latin word "honestum" and honorable good is not to be confounded with moral good.

NATURAL AND MORAL GOOD

This is a subdivision of honorable good and is derived from human activity. Natural good is a perfection suitable to man in as far as he operates according to his physical nature, e.g. labors, eats, etc. Moral good is a perfection suitable to man in accordance as he operates as a free being, e.g. virtue. (Therefore natural good has reference to the nature of man as a nature) moral good has a reference to the nature of man as rational.

THESIS XII.

122. Being and good are convertible.

The thesis implies that being and good are subject to simple conversion, so that all being is good and vice-versa. The question is of true good, however, not of apparent good.

For a proper understanding of the first part of the thesis note: that we do not say that every being is honorable, delectable and useful good. Nor do we imply that every being is good "simpliciter" i.e. that it has all possible perfection or

at least all due perfection. Nor do we mean that all being is good "secundum quid" i.e. that it is a finite good or is wanting in some possible perfection or one that is due to it. We altogether abstract from this last division.

What we do mean is that all being, is as far as it is being, has some goodness, is good under some aspect, either with regard to itself or with regard to some other thing. We say being, in as far as it is being. Something can be being and be without further being, thus man is being and yet is lacking in the perfection of wings. We imply that all being precisely as it is being and not in as far as it is lacking in some further perfection is good.

The adversaries of this part are the MANICHAEANS. These hold that there are two principles, the one the highest good, from which proceed all good things, the other the highest evil, from which arise creatures that are altogether evil viz. matter.

123. In the second part of the thesis we refute the opinion of those who have denied that all that which is good is being. It is the view of these that the good is of wider application than being, for there are negations, which in the mind of everyone are good, and yet cannot be called being. Thus the absence of the wolf is a good to the lamb; death which is the privation of life is a good to the just; the absence of defamation is good. Nor is it right to solve the difficulty by saying that these things are only apparent goods. They are apprehended as good because they are really so.

We think that the difficulty can be fairly met and solved by the aid of a distinction. These negations are not intrinsically good but only extrinsically so. They are good because they SUPPOSE OR ARE THE RESULTANT OF A POSITIVE GOOD, or because they are the CONDITION of such a good. Thus the absence of the wolf is a good to the lamb because it is a condition necessary for the survival of the lamb.

Hence we understand the second part in this sense; whatever is an intrinsic good is being, I concede; whatever is an extrinsic good is being, I subdistinguish; it has a relation to being, I concede, it is being, I deny.

Both parts of the thesis are certain.

124. 1. (Good to itself) Whatever has a perfection which is suitable to itself is a good to itself.

But every being has a perfection which is suitable to itself, viz. it has its own nature, its own existence and its own end.

Therefore every being is a good to itself.

2. (A good to some other thing) All being is either God or a creature. But God is a being suitable to creatures; for He is their efficient, exemplary and final cause. Creatures are suitable for God in as much as they praise and glorify their Creator.

Second Part.

Whatever is good has some perfection.

But all perfection is being; for the perfection which is nothing can not be understood.

Therefore whatever is good is being.

Note: With regard to the Manichaeans, cf. Catholic Encyclopaedia, also Turner's History of Philosophy, P. 219.

EVIL

125. Just as the good essentially consists in a certain suitability, so evil consists essentially in unsuitability, which is a privation as we shall prove.

Evil is divided into TRUE and APPARENT evil, into evil with regard to self and with regard to some other thing. These divisions can be easily understood from the similar divisions of the good. There are two other divisions of evil which have bearing only on rational creatures.

NATURAL evil is a privation of some physical good as are disease and death. MORAL evil is the privation of some good that is consequent upon the right ordering of the free will. Such a privation is sin. Moral good consists in the rectitude of free activity with regard to the norm of conduct. So moral evil consists in the lack of conformity between such a rule and free activity.

Note: To this division, Leibnitz added a third kind of evil viz. metaphysical. This consists in the limitation of the creature, the denial of ulterior perfection. Leibnitz calls this evil, **metaphysical**, because it essentially pertains to every creature. This seems to be a perversion of the term evil. According to common consent a privation and not a negation is called an evil.

CULPABLE EVIL is moral evil. PENAL EVIL is the privation of good inflicted because of culpable evil.

THESIS XIII.

Evil as such is a privation and is therefore in the good and from the good.

(126) Evil as such is not the entity which is called evil, as for instance the devil, a false judgment. It is that on account of which the entity is called evil and is therefore MALICE. The thesis aims at an explanation of two things; the essence and the cause of evil.

1. The Essence of Evil.

We deny that evil as such is either an entity or a negation. According to our opinion it must ever be a privation, a lack of due perfection. In opposition to this opinion is that of the Manichaeans and the religious system called Christian Science. The latter hold that evil is a pure entity of reason or of the imagination. Amongst the Scholastics, Cajetan and Vasquez, distinguish between natural and moral evil. According to them the former is a privation, the latter consists in something positive. The common opinion is that all evil whether natural or moral consists in a privation. Other Scholastics, e.g. de Benedictis, distinguishing between evil with regard to self and evil with regard to something else, say that the former consists in a privation, the latter is something positive. We concede that evil with regard to self is evil "simpliciter", that evil with regard to another is such by an extrinsic denomination. Hence even God can be said to be an evil to the devil. But evil with regard to another in so far as it is evil consists in a certain unsuitableness and is consequently a privation. This unsuitableness is twofold; in as far as something is lacking in a perfection which another rightly requires in it; or in as far as something deprives another of some perfection.

2. The Cause of Evil.

We suppose here the division of cause into material, efficient formal and final.

a. Evil as such has no formal cause other than itself. The privation itself is a quasi form.

b. With regard to final cause there is need of a distinction. Evil as such requires no final cause; for it can arise without the intention of the agent. It can, however, have a final cause; for it can be intended as a means; thus the judge can intend evil for the one found guilty.

c. There remains, therefore, the inquiry with regard to the material cause of evil, or that in which evil exists as in a subject, and with regard to the efficient cause, or that to the action of which the evil is due. It is our opinion that both these causes are good. An objection might be raised against this by urging that evil in as much as it is nothing needs no material or efficient cause. To this we point out that evil is not a negation but a privation which requires a subject and an efficient cause to induce the privation.

Proof of the Thesis.

1. Evil as such is a privation.

127. 1. That which is said to be evil with regard to itself is so because of some deficiency, v.g. either because it is not what it ought to be, or because there is wanting something which ought to be present.

But neither a negation nor any entity as such is a deficiency. Therefore evil with regard to self is a privation. The minor. If a deficiency were an evil, then all creatures would be evil and even absolute nothing could be so called.

2. A thing is called evil with regard to some thing else, either because it is lacking in some perfection which the other rightly demands in it, or because it deprives the other thing of some perfection (v.g. the justice of the judge deprives the criminal of liberty).

But both these evils imply unsuitableness and therefore a privation and without this unsuitableness they would not be evil.

2. The subject of evil is always being and a good.

A privation from its very concept requires a subject. This subject must be a positive entity. But as everything positive is being and good, the subject of evil must be such.

Corollary. Therefore "pure evil" according to the mind of the Manichaeans is an absolute repugnance.

3. The efficient cause of evil is being and a good.

Only an existing entity can be an efficient cause. But as all existing entity is good, so only a good entity can be the efficient cause of evil.

I. Against the First Fact

I. Evils exist. But a privation does not exist, for it is nothing. And so evil cannot consist in a privation.

R. Entities which are lacking in due perfection or which deprive other entities of perfection. c. Malice exists as a positive entity, N.

2. A privation cannot be diminished and increased but evils can.

R. With regard to this difficulty, we admit that evils cannot be increased or diminished by reason of themselves but by reason of the good of which there is a privation. Evil is said to be greater in a threefold sense: a) because that of which there is a privation is a greater good: thus sin is said to be a greater evil than a toothache; b) because some good of which there is a privation is more due to the subject, thus sin is a greater evil in a priest than in a layman; c) because the evil is more inveterate, thus the habit of rash judgment is a greater evil than a single rash judgment.

Answer for yourself these difficulties.

1. Error is a **positive** act and yet an evil.

2. That which moves an appetite is something positive and evil moves the appetite; thus a lamb flees the presence of the wolf.

3. **Nothing** is incapable of act. But evil displays activity. Thus a bad apple will corrupt other apples.

2. Against the second part.

129. Entity cannot be the subject of non-entity.

R. The subject properly so called, C; improperly so called, N.

2. One of two contraries cannot be the subject of the other. But good and evil are contraries.

R. The opposition between good and evil is privative.

3. Against the third part.

I. **Nothing** does not require an efficient cause.

R. A pure negation, c; a privation, n.

2. Every agent produces that which is similar to itself. Therefore evil ought to be produced by evil.

R. The agent that acts per se, c; per accidens, n.

BOOK TWO

THE CATEGORIES OR THE PRIMARY CLASSES OF BEING.

130. We have finished our treatise on BEING AS SUCH or on TRANSCENDENTAL BEING. The first division of transcendental being is into being "a se" and being "ab alio". But because being "a se" or God can be brought under no category and His nature and perfections as revealed by the light of natural reason are treated in Natural Theology, we will discuss here only the divisions of being "ab alio" or of finite being.

131. The Scholastics under the lead of Aristotle divide all finite realities which can be predicated of any subject into ten classes, categories or predicaments. This distribution is not obtained by a consideration of the number of things but by an examination of the various **MODES** of being which we discover in things. Being either exists in itself or in something else. If it has the former mode of being, it is said to be a substance; If it has the latter mode of being it is said to be an accident.

Accident being is of different kinds according to the various ways it is found in something else. Entity can exist in something else either as giving it extension of parts, or as modifying it, or as constituting it in relation to something else, or as the action or the passion of this thing, or as determining it with reference to place, time, position or external circumstances. These different modes are the different kinds of accidents and are, quantity, relation, action, passion, location, time position, and habit.

132. The being which is explicitly mentioned in the categories is **REAL FINITE BEING WHICH IS "PER SE" ONE AND COMPLETE**. It is said to be a) **REAL ENTITY**, sc., that which exists or can exist in nature; thus are excluded entities of reason; b) **FINITE ENTITY**, for infinite entity, because it contains the perfections of all things can not be reduced to any genus; c) **"PER SE" ONE.**, to exclude entities which are **ONE "PER ACCIDENS"**; d)

COMPLETE i.e. essentially; for the parts and the constituent principles, as also complement modes e.g. personality, are not directly but only indirectly and reductively in the category of that thing to which they belong.

133. With regard to quantity, quality, action and passion, place, time, and position, nothing will be said here as it is more usual and convenient to treat them in Cosmology after an investigation into the nature of BODIES. There is nothing of value to say with regard to habit, which is the name of vesture or ornament pertaining to the body. Our treatise therefore divides itself into three chapters.

CHAPTER I. ON SUBSTANCE.

CHAPTER II. ON ACCIDENTS IN GENERAL.

CHAPTER III. ON RELATIONS.

BOOK I.

CHAPTER I.

ARTICLE I.

SUBSTANCE

THESIS XIII.

Substance is objectively real and is not a mere figment of the mind according to the postulate of the Sensists and the Phenomenists.

134. SUBSTANCE is entity subsisting in itself or "per se". This is equivalent to saying that substance is being with a competency to subsist in itself and independently of any other being as a subject in which it must inhere.
Explanation.

1. Substance is being subsisting in itself, and not subsisting in another. One thing can exist in another in a twofold manner:

- a) as a constituent or within the essence of this thing, as for instance, when it constitutes the primal essence of this thing. Thus the human soul exists in man as a constituent element. Substantial mode of

being is not opposed to this mode of being in an other. The mode of being proper to substance as it is commonly taken is a mode of being which is opposed to the mode of being proper to accidents. But it is not a mode of being proper to accidents to exist within the essence of a thing as a constituent element.

- b) An entity exists in another "inherently" or outside of its fully constituted essence, when it is an affection superadded to its complete essence. It is such a mode of being which is excluded from the common notion of substance. For an affection which is superadded to an entity and which is outside of the fully constituted essence of this entity is in a proper sense said to "accidere" or to happen to or to approach this entity. Such an entity has a mode of being which is said to be accidental and it is to this mode of being that the mode of being which is proper to substance is opposed.

2. Substance is being standing "per se". To stand "per se" is almost the same as to stand "in se"; for it means existence without support from another. "Per se", however, does not signify "a se" or existence independent of an efficient cause, but it does signify "non in alio" or existence independent of a subject of inhesion. Substance is opposed to accident not through independence of an efficient cause but through independence of a subject of inhesion.

135. In substance we can distinguish three formalities, the absolute characteristic of standing in itself or the **perseity**, the **relative** characteristic of standing beneath the accidents, and the characteristic of **permanence** which is opposed to the succession of phenomena.

1. Perseity and not the characteristic of **standing beneath accident** is the formal characteristic of substance. Perseity is ontologically prior to the characteristic of **standing beneath accident** and therefore in it the formal essence of substance is found.

Proof:

a) One substance, viz. the Divine, stands "per se" and yet supports no accidents. Therefore the characteristic of supporting accidents is not essential to the notion of substance as such.

b) For an essence to subsist in itself and not to need support is a characteristic in it prior to that by which it is the support of accident.

2. The formal characteristic of substance does not consist in permanence underlying successive changes, because;

a) To subsist **in self** is prior in the nature of things to permanence in existence and also prior to the office of being the substratum beneath accidents and phenomena:

b) Certain accidents have permanence;

c) Permanence, although it generally follows substance, absolutely speaking is accidental to substance, for we can conceive of a substance without permanence, e.g. if a substance were destroyed as soon as it was produced.

3. Perseity, although it is negatively expressed is a positive perfection; for although it is a negation of dependence on a subject of inhesion, it expresses the perfection of self sufficiency, by which a thing subsisting in itself supports itself and accidents in existence. Perseity is a primal constituent of being and so by reason of perseity substance is said to be being "simpliciter", while accidents are said to be being with a relation to substance.

136. DIVISIONS OF SUBSTANCE.

1. First and Second substance.

First substance is individual and actual and is neither in any other thing as in a subject of inhesion nor since it is singular and not universal is predicable of any other subject inferior to itself, e.g. this man.

Second substance is universal substance and is not in any other thing as in a subject of inhesion, but is predicable of a subject, since it is an abstract and common notion. It signifies, therefore, the "genera" and "species" in the predicament of substance. Hence **second** substance is in **first** substance not as in a subject of inhesion, but as the universal in the singular. Thus the universal notion of man is verified in individual men and is predicated of them. **First** substance **formally** exists outside of the mind and is the foundation of second substance; second substance does not exist **formally** except in the mind but has a basis outside the mind.

2. Simple and composite substance.

First substance can be simple or composite. **Simple** substance is that which does not consist of parts really distinct as the substance of God. **Composite** substance consists

of physical substantial parts, which are really distinct, e.g. man.

When we say in the thesis that substance is objectively real, we mean that extramentally there are entities which subsist in themselves, or which stand "per se" and which are opposed to the inherent mode of existence which is characteristic of accidents. Our question is concerned with FIRST SUBSTANCE.

Adversaries.

137. Locke, although he afterwards refused to admit that he had denied substance, nevertheless, repeatedly asserted that we have no true idea of substance, and as far as this notion is concerned can be rightly looked upon as the father of modern scepticism. All our ideas according to his teaching are acquired either by **sensation** or **reflection** and in neither way can an idea of substance be acquired. Specific substances are nothing else save **collections** of determinate qualities intimately united. Under these qualities we fancy that there is some supporting **sub-stratum** because we cannot conceive how accidents could exist alone. And so we have no idea of substance in general, but by this word we imply some vague **substratum**, about which we know nothing. Similarly **Hume** taught that substance was the collection of determinate qualities, under which we fancy there is some supporting element. The same error is common to all the **Sensists** and **Positivists**. **Taine** denies that substances exist; he asserts that there is only a collection of system of facts and that the idea of substance is a psycholological illusion. Many modern philosophers and natural scientists confound the notion of substance with the activity of bodies. Thus Lotze, G. Paulsen, Wundt, Oswald.

On the other hand, since we necessarily think of Substance, Kant and his followers assert that substance is an **a priori subjective** form which has no objective validity. Cf. Turner's History of Philosophy, index v. Substance. Catholic Encyclopaedia—Substance.

Proof

138.

Argument 1.

That which exists outside the mind is objectively real.

But substance exists outside the mind.
Therefore Substance is objectively real.

Minor. Consciousness testifies;

1. That thoughts and volitions arise in the subject, which I call the EGO.
2. That this subject is primal and does not inhere in another.
3. That this subject is one and permanently identical with itself in the multiple flow of phenomenon. When we say; I think, I thought, I was thinking, we speak of the same subject.

But a primal subject, not inhering in another, and in which other things inhere is a substance.

139.

Argument 2.

If anything exists "a parte rei", substance certainly exists.

But something does exist "a parte rei".

Therefore substance certainly exists.

Major. If anything exists "a parte rei" it exists "in se" or not "in se" i.e. "in alio". If it exists "in se", the reality of substance is admitted; if it exists in another, this other is "ens in se" and hence substance, or "ens in alio". Unless we finally admit "ens in se", we have an infinite regression of entities "in alio" without entity "in se" which is repugnant.

It may be objected that by the Divine Omnipotence accidents can be sustained without substance, e.g. as in the Eucharist. To this we answer that these accidents are sustained by God, Who is Substance. Thus it remains true that if anything exists, substance exists. Or again it is urged why could there not be an INFINITE number of accidents of which one would sustain the other. A multitude actually infinite is probably repugnant, but abstracting from this repugnance the whole series of accidents would not have an adequately sufficient reason of their existence. It is equally fallacious to argue that three canes can be so placed together as to sustain one another although one of them could not stand "per se". There is something which sustains the canes. Thus if there were no substance, there would be nothing to sustain the accidents.

140. Corollary I. Therefore, if the concept of substance had

not objective validity no concept would have and the result would be philosophical Nihilism.

Corollary 2. Therefore, the opinion of the Dynamists is erroneous, who make substance, force or energy. From common usage force or energy signifies an accident, the potency of doing something. But to claim a potency without a subject in which the potency exists, is an absurdity.

141. Scholion 1. Origin of substance.

By our senses we perceive only the external affections of bodies. Because we apprehend these not abstractly but concretely (this green thing—this sweet thing) we also in some way or other but “per accidens” attain to the substance. Hence substance is said to be a “sensibile per accidens”. Similarly the intellect does not primarily understand the affection without the substance or the substance without the affection, but both together (this colored thing—this sweet thing). In this concrete concept it afterwards distinguishes the subject (substance) and the form (accident) and apprehends the one without the other. Therefore, the Positivists are wrong when they claim that we add a substratum to accidents. The substratum is immediately perceived.

Scholion 2. We must make a clear distinction between substance in general and specific substances (e.g. gold-silver). We have a clear and immediate concept of substance in general viz. “ens per se”. But we are ignorant of the intrinsic constitution of specific substances. Hence we do not know these through their essential differences but through their properties as the chemical elements. Since the opinion of the Positivists seems to be altogether absurd, Pesch, Coffey, Mercier thought that they did not wish to deny anything except immediate knowledge of specific substances. It would be, perhaps more correct to say that, since they did not attend to the distinction which we have made, they were led to a false notion of substance.

Scholion 3. Time does not permit us to explain, develop and verify here the division of substance into complete and incomplete, though this division will be used in Cosmology.

Difficulties

142.

1. If the senses do not attain substance, our intellect cannot attain it. But our senses do not attain substance. Therefore, etc. Thus the Sensists.

Ans. Our senses attain substance materially but not formally. Cf. Scholion 1.

2. Contingent entity is phenomenon. But we know only contingent entities. Therefore we know only phenomenon. Ans. I deny the minor.

3. Let us suppose that the substratum of accidents were entirely destroyed. Then the sensible qualities would affect our senses exactly as before and it would be incorrect to argue to the notion of substance.

Ans. 1. "Ex absurdis sequitur quidquam." Cf. the second argument, where we proved that if anything exists substance must exist.

Ans. 2. In that hypothesis the subject conscious of itself would still exist "in se". Also reason would demonstrate the existence of a First Entity "a se" and "in se".

4. Substance is that which remains. But nothing remains in the physical order.

I distinguish the Major. Permanence is a formal constituent of substance., N. Permanence is a real consequent of substance. I subdistinguish; Absolute permanence. N. Relative permanence, C. I contradict distinguish the minor: There is no relative permanence, I deny; there is no absolute permanence; I again subdistinguish: in created things, I concede; in God, I deny. Permanence is a property of substance only in this sense: if the change of accidents takes place within the same essential degree of perfection, substance remains the same, e.g. a man resting, sleeping, thinking, etc., if the change of accidents is in relation to an order essentially different, substance itself is changed.

5. In man there are opposite faculties, e.g. those of feeling and thinking. Therefore man is not one substance or nature but an assemblage of qualities.

I distinguish the antecedent; and each of these qualities is a specific determinant of man, I deny; of these, one only is a specific determinant, the others are generic, I subdistinguish: and man is a simple entity, I deny; a composite entity, I concede.

A faculty which is strictly a property can be different in the same entity.

A nature which is specifically different from some other nature can be in generic agreement with it. Thus it can

have faculties similar to the other nature. About this more in Psychology.

6. We know nothing about specific substances except that they are an assemblage of qualities. I deny; from the perfection of the accidents we argue to the specific nature.
7. It is impossible to form a concept of the subject of accidents. I distinguish; an intuitive concept, I concede; an abstract concept which manifests the nature of the thing and clearly distinguishes it from some other substance of a different genus, I deny. Urraburu,—Ont. Pg. 763.
8. It is possible for an assemblage of qualities to exist without a substratum. One quality can sustain the other and so on. I deny the assertion. What would sustain the first quality, if by nature it needs no subject of inhesion, it is substance; if it does need such a subject, there would be an infinite regression. The whole circle or assemblage of qualities needs a subject of support or it needs no such subject. If the second alternative is the true one, the assemblage is substance. If the first is true, then substance must be admitted or an infinite regression.

CHAPTER I.

ARTICLE II.

SUPPOSITION AND PERSONALITY

THESIS XIV.

Hypostasis or suppositum is rightly defined: "Singular complete and incommunicable substance." (Rational suppositum, which is not constituted by actual consciousness) or liberty, has rightly obtained the special name of person.

143. The first part.

SUPPOSITUM (HYPOSTASIS) signifies "placed under something else. Etymologically this word can signify the same as substance or subject. It has been restricted, however, by ecclesiastical writers. In the meaning attached to the word by these, suppositum signifies that which is "maxime

in se", a subject fully standing "in se", a subject of everything which is in the entity and which is predicable of it.

Suppositum, therefore, is not any substance, but FIRST or INDIVIDUAL substance. It would seem sufficiently well defined as: "singular complete substance". As a matter of fact Aristotle gave this definition nor by the light of merely natural reason could we know the necessity of any further discriminating note. In the natural order, all singular and complete substances are "supposita."

However, by the light of faith we know, that in our Divine Lord Christ, there are two complete natures and one suppositum, viz. the nature of God and the nature of man, united in the person or the suppositum of the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity. Similarly Faith teaches us that in God there is one nature and three supposita or Persons. We can, therefore, immediately conclude that the concept of nature or substance, even if it be complete and singular, is not ALTOGETHER identical with the concept of suppositum. Moreover, because they did not sufficiently distinguish between complete nature and suppositum, the SABELLIANS claimed one person in God, the TRITHEISTS, three natures and three gods, the NESTORIANS taught that there were in Christ two supposita or persons, and the EUTYCHIANs claimed one nature in Christ. All these have been condemned by the church.

It is not the province of the philosopher to demonstrate or to explain revealed truths. Nevertheless, since truth can not contradict truth, it is the duty of the philosopher to look upon revealed truth as a negative norm for his guidance. In other words the philosopher ought not to establish any conclusion which is at variance with revelation, nor will an adequate examination of his subject compel him to such a conclusion. Truth accepted from revelation cannot contradict truth received by the light of reason for the simple but conclusive reason that all truth whether revealed or natural—ultimately comes from God, the ontological source of all truth.

144.

The Second Part.

Some supposita are rational, others irrational. Rational suppositum has obtained a special name, that of PERSON. In the second part we give reasons for the rectitude of this.

The question is on physical personality. There is a moral personality such as that which is found in the family and in society and a juridical personality such as that which obtains before the law.

145.

The Third Part.

In this part we reject two divergent definitions of personality which are current in Modern Philosophy.

a) According to Locke and Hume, personality consists in ACTUAL CONSCIOUSNESS of one's own activity. Hence, that which is not conscious of its own activity, is not a person. Descartes, Leibnitz, Wolff, Herbart, Lotze held the same opinion. Cf. Rickaby, General Metaphysics, pp. 284-290. Coffey. pp. 276-284.

b) According to Kant, V. Cousin and Rosmini, person is a subject endowed with liberty.

Proof of the First Part

146.

Suppositum is a subject standing fully "per se".

But such a subject is necessarily;

a) SUBSTANCE: for an accident needs another entity.

b) SINGULAR: for universal (second) substance cannot exist without first substance.

c) COMPLETE: for incomplete substance has an ordination to something else.

d) INCOMMUNICABLE: in such wise that it is in no way in another nor a part of another.

Therefore suppositum is rightly defined as; "singular complete incommunicable substance".

Proof of the Second Part

147.

The perfection peculiar to suppositum is to be in itself and for itself.

Therefore a suppositum which is in itself and for itself more eminently deserves a special name.

But the rational suppositum is in itself and for itself in a manner more eminent than other supposita.

Therefore the rational suppositum rightly deserves a special name, viz. that of PERSON.

The Minor. Only a rational suppositum a) can be in itself and for itself INTENTIONALLY, in as far as it can be CONSCIOUS of its own unity and totality.

b) has DOMINION OVER ITS OWN ACTIVITY, in as much as it can do this or that; has an ultimate internal perfect end,—when other supposita have an extrinsic end. With regard to the last, cf. Cf. Urraburu, pg. 842.

Proof of the Third Part

148.

1. Person is rational suppositum, and so is a substantial perfection.
But a substantial perfection cannot be constituted by an accident, such as would be actual consciousness of self or an act of the free-will.
Therefore a person is not constituted by consciousness or liberty.
2. Wherever the definition of a thing is wanting, there the thing itself is wanting.
Therefore, if a person were constituted by **consciousness** or **liberty**, infants, those sleeping, etc., would not be persons; hence would have no rights, which cannot be admitted.

Scholion. The definition of person by Boethius is well known. "Naturae rationalis individua substantia". This definition is admissible, if substance signifies complete substance, if individual signifies incommunicability which is complete, and rational includes intellectual.

CHAPTER II.

ARTICLE I.

THESIS XV.

Amongst created entities besides substances there exist real accidents which are really distinct from substance. It cannot be shown that it is repugnant to the concept of accident absolutely to exist without a subject.
149.

Amongst CREATED entities; for there are no accidents in God. Besides substances; in thesis XIII. we proved that substances are objectively real. Here we move the same

question with regard to accidents and we wish to establish the existence of at least certain accidents, as real and actual entities, which are really distinct from the substances in which they naturally inhere.

ACCIDENT is said to be derived from "accidere" because accidents are superadded to substance. Accident in its general signification is divided into LOGICAL or predicable and REAL or predicamental accident.

LOGICAL accident is that which is superadded to substance but which neither constitutes the essence nor necessarily flows from it. The name arises from the mode of predication; it is, therefore, a predicate which is opposed to an essential predicate and which whatever it may be in its own physical entity neither essentially nor necessarily but only contingently is predicated of some subject.

REAL accident is an entity which has an exigency to exist in a subject inhesively. It is always a real entity and is opposed to that mode of being "in se" which we have called substance. It can be something necessarily flowing from some essence or something contingently inhering in that essence. The name, therefore, is derived not from the mode of predication but from the mode of being. It is of this that we are speaking in the thesis.

EXPLANATION.

- A thing can be said to be in another in many ways.
- a) As a constituent element or within the essence of this thing, as a constituent or integral part of the essence. An entity which exists in this way, exists "in se" even though incompletely. It does not happen to an entity but is an intrinsic constituent. It is not, therefore, a real accident.
 - b) As a thing contained in the container, as a thing in place or in time, as an effect in its cause, as the thing known in the subject knowing. In the thesis there is no question of this mode of being in another. Such ways of being in another are not opposed to the mode of being which is proper to substance.
 - c) INHESIVELY or in another as in a subject of inhesion, i.e., as an affection superadded to substance subsisting in itself, and determining it by an entity which is contingent with relation to the substance itself, and in such wise that the determining entity cannot naturally exist except in the subject in which it inheres. This is the mode of being proper to accident. That which is superadded to complete substance

gives it no ulterior determination in the line of substance nor does it contribute to substance its first being. It contributes a second "esse", intrinsically dependent upon the subject. Therefore, it does not exist "in se", but is a reality with a natural exigency to exist in something else. Accident comes as an ulterior modification of substance already complete in itself and hence naturally demands the presence of that thing of which it is the modification.

N.B. We do not say in the first part of the thesis how many accidents are really distinct from substance.

WHICH ARE REALLY DISTINCT FROM SUBSTANCE:
—by a major or a minor real distinction.

IT CANNOT BE SHOWN etc. i.e. no repugnance can be shown between the concept of accident and the absolute possibility of the existence of an accident without a subject of inhesion. In the thesis we offer no positive proof that the accidents can exist separately. This only is our contention, that human reason can show no repugnance in this that an accident as such should through the omnipotence of God exist without a subject in which it actually inheres. In other words it cannot be proved that actual inherence is of the formal nature of an accident. We claim that aptitudinal inherence or the exigency to inhere is of the essence of accident.
150.

In the second part there is no question of all accidents. We admit that there are certain accidents which not even by Divine power can exist without a subject. Such are relative accidents, which have for their foundation the substance itself, and those absolute accidents which are only distinguished from their subject by a real minor distinction.

Thus vital acts postulate the actual influx of the principal from which they proceed; thus also modal accidents cannot exist without actual inherence in the subject of which they are modes. This impossibility, however does not proceed from the fact that they are accidents but from the peculiar nature of this particular kind of accidents. Hence in the thesis it is said that it cannot be shown to be repugnant to the concept of accident as accident to exist without a subject.
151.

In the Holy Eucharist there remain after consecration the same numerical accidents as were formerly inherent in the substance of the bread and wine. According to the com-

mon opinion of the Scholastics, quantity is immediately inherent in substance, whilst the rest of the accidents have for their subject quantity itself. Quantity is an accidental act that comes to a corporeal thing already constituted in its substantial act. It is really distinct from substance and contributes to it internal situational extension besides aptitudinal external extension and aptitudinal impenetrability. Although this reality is naturally dependent on substance as a subject of inherence, nevertheless, because it has its own reality, distinct from the reality of the substance, we claim that on the hypothesis of the cessation of the natural subject, it involves no repugnance that God should conserve this reality by conferring, as First Cause, what the second cause naturally confers viz., sustentation. This reality of quantity, which is the reason why a body has parts also in space, has also its own parts locally extended. Whilst, therefore, this reality remains with its extraposition of parts in space, there remains the same extension in space of the species which was present whilst the bread and the wine were still in existence. And so, in the Holy Eucharist, the accidents of the bread and wine inhere in quantity. Cf. Catholic Encyclopaedia. Eucharist. 152.

"Absolutely" not indeed naturally but at least by the Omnipotence of God. These accidents are sustained by God, not as the subject in which they inhere, but by His efficient causality.

153.

Adversaries of the first part of the thesis are the **Cartesians**, who admit nothing outside of substance except various relations to external terms (motion, rest) and mere modifications of substance which are not real.

Proof of the First Part

154.

(From the testimony of consciousness.)

There exist in the physical order thoughts and volitions, which are real and absolute entities, and which, on the testimony of consciousness, are produced by the real action of the soul, and come and go, whilst the soul remains the same.

But real and absolute entities which inhere in substance, which are produced by substance, which come and go whilst the substance remains the same, are real accidents really distinct from substance. Therefore, etc.

As to the Major.

a) On the testimony of consciousness, it is evident that thoughts and volitions exist in the actual order, are produced by the soul, come and go, whilst the soul remains the same, and inhere in the soul.

Therefore these cognitions and volitions are real entities really distinct from substance.

b) That these cognitions are absolute entities is proved in this manner.

The term of action is either something absolute or relative or is nothing. But neither the second nor the third can be admitted. Therefore, etc.

As to the Minor. A relative thing cannot be produced without the production of something absolute and then we have what we seek. For if nothing absolute is produced anew, it cannot be explained why the relative did not exist before. Cf. Urraburu. Ont. Pg. 902. As to the third part of the minor, it is evident that an action by which nothing is done is repugnant.

Proof of the Second Part

155.

(From solving the apparent contradiction.)

If the repugnance of an accident separate from its substance can be shown, it must be sought

a) from the real identity of the accident with its substance
b) or because the actual influx of the substance is necessary for the sustentation of the accident;
c) or because actual inherence is of the essence of the accident;

d) or from a defect of finality, because separate accidents would not have an end to which they could be ordered. But no repugnance can be shown from any of these sources. Therefore, etc.

As to the Major. The disjunction of the major is complete; for there is no other way that separation could conflict with the notion of accident as such.

As to the Minor.

a) NOT FROM REAL IDENTITY, for from the first part of the thesis it is evident that there are real accidents, which are really distinct from substance.

- b) NOT FROM THE NECESSITY OF THE ACTUAL INFLUX OF THE SUBSTANCE IN SUSTAINING THE ACCIDENT: accident because of the insufficiency of its mode of being needs to be sustained. But whatever be the nature of this influx, the Divine Omnipotence can supply it at least in the line of efficient causality, For God the First Cause can do what secondary causes can do.
- c) NOT FROM THE FACT THAT ACTUAL INHERENCE IS OF THE ESSENCE OF ACCIDENT: for aptitudinal inherence alone is of the essence of accident. Through this alone accident is perfectly differentiated from its opposite, substance. For substance is entity "in se"; it is not in another actually nor aptitudinally. Hence the mode of being proper to accident is sufficiently vindicated, if it be of the nature and the exigency of accident to be in some subject, since in this way is proclaimed its lack of self sufficiency which is its peculiar characteristic. Accident, therefore, does not require absolutely a subject but the sustaining power of a subject, which it has naturally from substance and miraculously from the exercise of Divine efficiency.

The separated accident cannot be said to stand in itself, nor to take on the mode of being proper to substance, because it exists supernaturally without a subject. It has lost none of its native insufficiency; hence it needs to be sustained and this need is supplied by God acting as efficient cause.

- d) NOT FROM THE DEFECT OF FINALITY, because the total end of some accidents is not to modify substance. They have a natural ordination to another end. Thus quantity performs the office of subject for the other accidents, qualities are the principles of their proper actions as is evident from the fact that they affect our senses.

156.

All accidental mutations which happen either in us or in other things are only relations which without any new reality come to substances solely from the presence or absence of other substances. Hence from these mutations no proof can be drawn for the existence of accidental realities really distinct from substance.

The antecedent is denied. If the real relation is a new one, it necessarily presupposes an intrinsic change in one or other of the extremes. For the subject of a relation is not related to the term except in virtue of something intrinsic to itself; the same can be said of the term of relation. Granted, therefore, a new real relation, something new exists in one or other of the extremes. This from the hypothesis is not the substance and it is in the substance; it is then a real absolute accident. Thus the act of knowledge or love in our soul cannot be a mere relation of the soul to the object. For a relation, granted the presence of the subject and the term immediately arises; whilst on the contrary granted the existence of the soul and the object a relation of knowledge or love does not immediately arise. Something else, therefore, is required, viz. an action by which the soul which is in potency to know and to love may become **intrinsically** in the act of knowing and loving. This action cannot be said to be nothing but is a real entity of knowledge or love affecting the soul. Cf. Urraburu. Pg. 902.

2. Accident as an entity of an entity does not exist, unless by the existence of substance. But that which does not exist except by the existence of substance is not really distinct from substance. I distinguish the antecedent. Accident does not exist except by the first and accidental existence of substance. I concede. The existence which the accident brings with it, actuates first and "per se" the composite; and so substance and accident communicate in one and the same existence. Nevertheless, the reality of the accident is really distinct from the substance, for the substance by means of the accident becomes something which it was not before.

3. That which is in another has no entity by which it is distinguished from that other thing.

I distinguish the major. That which is in another as a constituent, I transmit; that which is in another inhesively,

I subdistinguish; it has not a perfect entity, I concede; it has not an imperfect entity; I deny.

4. If substance receives from accident determinations without which it cannot exist, substance is not really distinct from accident. But such is the case. Therefore, etc.

I distinguish the major. If substance receives from accident essential and specific determination, I transmit; accidental and secondary, I deny.

It is from its substantial entity that substance receives that by which it is SUCH an entity.

5. If substance were really distinct from accident, accident and substance would be two entities.

I distinguish; they would be two entities separate from one another. I deny; They would through their union constitute one entity "per accidens", I concede.

6. If accident were really distinct from substance, accident could not be predicated of substance. But accident can be predicated of substance, e.g. This man is FAT.

I distinguish; accident could not be predicated of substance in the concrete, I deny, in the abstract, I concede.

In the example "This man is fat" the identity is affirmed between man and the subject having fatness and not between man and fatness itself. Fat is a concrete term and so signifies "in recto," the subject having fatness. The proposition is only true as far as the predicate is identical with the subject "in recto".

7. Nothing real can come to an entity complete in its essence. But accident is supposed to come to an entity complete in its essence. I distinguish the Major. To an entity altogether complete, I concede; to an entity which is only essentially complete, I subdistinguish; nothing real and substantial can come to such an entity, I concede; nothing real and accidental, I deny.

8. If there were accidents, they ought to be educed from substance. But the eduction of an accident from a substance is unintelligible. I concede the major. I deny the minor. Substance is as far as it can receive this or that determination is entity in potency; the determination itself is the act. Accident, therefore, is contained in the potency of substance, i.e. there is in substance that from which the accident can come. Substance has the intrinsic aptitude by means of the accidental form to receive ulterior actuation. Moreover to

say that the accident is educed from the potency of substance means nothing else than that the substance BECOMES IN ACT ACCORDING TO THE ACCIDENTAL ENTITY THAT TO WHICH IT WAS IN POTENCY. Hence education is not creation but in a true and real sense transmutation. That alone is created which is not derived from a preexistent subject. In educative action substance contributes of its own to the production of the accidental entity. It concurs after the manner of a material cause according to the natural potency which it has to receive this accident entity. Hence this accidental entity does not come EXTRINSICALLY: it arises in substance and intrinsically depends upon it in its "fieri". For this reason the proper term of educative action is not the accidental entity but the composite of substance and accident.

9. Substance is contained in the notion of accident.

I distinguish; as a constituent element, I deny; as the term of a relation, I concede.

157.

1. That which exists without a subject of inhesion is a substance.

I distinguish; an entity thus existing which has no natural exigency for a subject of inhesion, is a substance: I concede; which has such an exigency, I deny.

2. Actual inhesion is the mode of existence connatural to an accident. I distinguish; ordinarily, I concede; absolutely necessary, I deny.

3. It involves a repugnance for God to sustain accidents.

I distinguish; as material cause so that the accidents would inhere in the Divine substance, I concede; as an efficient cause, in as far as God would grant to the accidents to exist separately; I deny.

4. Accident has an essential relation to substance and without this relation cannot even be conceived.

I distinguish; every accident has an essential relation to substance. I concede; accident is constituted by such a relation, I subdistinguish; some accidents, I transmit; all accidents I deny.

Accident includes by its very nature a relation to some subject; but every accident is not totally absolved by such a relation, so that it totally consists in it. There are accidents

which have a proper and absolute entity conjoined with the relation.

5. Thought and volition have a proper and absolute entity, really distinct from substance and yet cannot exist separate from it.

Answer 1. I concede the whole of this argument. What is the consequence against the thesis? In the thesis we do not maintain that every accident which has a proper and absolute entity can exist separately.

Answer 2. Thought and volition are unable to exist separately not because they are accidents but because they are such accidents viz., which necessarily imply the actual influx of a substantial principle.

6. If God should sustain accident without substance, He would sustain the sign without the thing signified. But this is to be guilty of deception.

I concede the Major. I distinguish the Minor. If such a sign had also another use, I deny; if it had no other use except to signify one definite thing, I subdistinguish; if the exception is revealed, I deny; if the exception is not revealed, I concede.

CHAPTER II.

ARTICLE II.

MODES

158. We are not speaking of modes of being, either proper or common, but we are speaking of a physical mode, which can be described as: an entity really distinct from the subject, the totality of whose being consists in the actual and ultimate determination of an indifferent subject.

Explanation.

Created beings even completely existing are still indifferent with regard to certain states. Thus the body is indifferent to rest and motion; moreover, it can be here or there, although it must be somewhere. That which formally removes this indifference or determination is called a mode.

Such a mode is an entity, in as far as it is not nothing, nor is it a mere entity of reason, for the body really has motion,

independently of our knowledge. Nevertheless this mode is not an entity fully in the same sense as substance, or even an absolute accident, whose entity can exist without its subject at least supernaturally.

It is an entity really distinct from the subject, because otherwise it would be a metaphysical mode, which is really identified with its subject as the unity or goodness of being.

Moreover, the totality of the physical mode is said to consist in the ultimate and actual determination of the subject. This means that the mode cannot exist except as actually determining the subject. In this the physical mode differs from other physical accidents, which can exist although they do not actually determine their subject. This mode cannot be determined by a further mode but is in itself a determining form; hence it is said to be an ultimate determination. An illustration of this doctrine. "If a piece of wax has a certain definite shape, this shape is inseparable from the wax; it is nothing except in the wax, for it cannot exist apart from the wax; but in the wax it is something in some real sense distinct from the wax; inasmuch as the wax would persist even if it disappeared. No doubt it is essential to the wax as extended in shape, to have some shape or other; but it is indifferent to any particular shape, and hence something distinct from it is required to remove this indifference. Coffey, p. 246.

A mode and a modal accident are not altogether the same. They agree in this, that neither can exist separate, from its subject. This repugnance in the mode comes not from the generic concept, but from the specific nature, namely, that it is such an accident.

Modes are either substantial or accidental. Accidental modes give accidental determination to complete substance, as figure, motion, action. Substantial modes determine substance already existing in the individual, but nevertheless incomplete with regard to some substantial characteristic, so for instance, the union of matter and form.


Those who admit physical modes divide the real distinction into a major and minor distinction. The major distinction takes place between thing and thing; the minor distinction takes place between the thing and its modes, or even between two modes.

CHAPTER II.

ARTICLE III.

THE DIVISION OF ACCIDENTS

159.



160.

Real accident is divided into extrinsic and intrinsic. Extrinsic accident is present when the reality on account of which an accidental denomination pertains to the subject, properly and really does not inhere in the subject, but is conceived as inhering, and so denominates the subject in respect to something extrinsic. Thus the whereness of a body is denominated by the encircling reality, its position in time by extrinsic time, its state of being known or loved by an action which is intrinsic to the one knowing or loving. It is indeed called an accident but as a matter of fact it does not answer to the definition of a real and proper accident. It is rather an extrinsic denomination than an accident in the proper sense of the word. Intrinsic accident or an entity which has an exigency to be in a subject inhesively alone corresponds to the definition of an accident in the proper sense.

161.

An intrinsic accident is either metaphysical or physical. It is called metaphysical if it is distinguished from substance not by a real distinction but by one of reason, thus risibility with regard to man or immortality with regard to the human soul. Hence metaphysical accident has not the nature of accident in the real sense but only according to our way of conception. Thus it is not really but only logically opposed

to substance. Physical accident is really distinct from substance and in a reality superadded to substance but truly inherent in it and in accident in the most proper sense.
162.

Physical accident is divided into absolute and modal. Modal accident is that whose total nature consists in the modification of the subject. It is distinct from the subject by a real and minor distinction. Absolute accident is that which besides its ordination to the subject has its own proper reality and hence is distinct to the subject by a real and major distinction.

N.B. Not all the authors divide accident in the same way but the discussion is merely a question of names.

CHAPTER III.

ARTICLE I.

RELATIONS

163.

1. **The Definition.** The RELATIVE is opposed to the ABSOLUTE. The absolute is entity in as far as it has no reference to anything else; the relative is entity in as far as it is referred to something else. To illustrate; man is something absolute; for although man depends on God, nevertheless, God does not belong to his essence or his cognoscibility. A father is not thus absolute but is something relative. A relative is a concrete form, i.e. it designates a subject with a form. Relation is an abstract term, i.e. a form on account of which a subject is denominated as relative. A relation might be defined; "the order or reference or habitude of one thing to another."

2. **Elements of a relation.** Three things are required for a relation; a subject, which is referred to something else; a term, to which the subject is referred; a FOUNDATION of reason why the subject is referred to the term. To illustrate; Peter and Paul are white and are, therefore similar by reason of their whiteness. Hence between them there is a relation of similitude. The subject is Peter or Paul; the term is Paul or Peter; the foundation is whiteness. The subject and the term are called the extremes of the relation. The

adequate foundation is the foundation which is in both subject and term; the inadequate foundation is the foundation in the subject alone.

3. Entity "IN" and Entity "AD".

The foundation of the relation is always something absolute. The absolute alone inheres in the subject; the relation necessarily has a bearing on something else. Hence the relation according to its "entity in" is the foundation; the relation according to its "entity ad" is the connection between the extremes. Hence it is evident that this connection is not something absolute. It depends entirely on the coexistence of two things.

DIVISION

164.

Transcendental and Predicamental relation.

Transcendental relation belongs to the essence of the subject, so that without it the subject as such could neither be nor be conceived. Thus, the creature relative to God, cognition relative to the object known, action relative to the thing produced. Since this relation is identical with the essence of the subject, it is not an accident, nor does it pertain to the category of accidents. It is placed here for the sake of comparison with the predicamental relation. It is called transcendental, not because it belongs to very entity, but because it can belong to entities of different categories.

2. The **predicamental** relation does not belong to the essence of the subject, e.g., similtude and dissimiltude; equality and inequality. Since this relation is contingent, it requires some real foundation, which is really distinct from the subject.

3. The distinction between the two kinds of relations. The predicamental relation solely expresses habitude with regard to something else and exercises no other function with regard to the term; hence it results from the position of the foundation and the term. The transcendental relation exercises another function with regard to the term, that is, the subject causes the term, or is the effect of the term, or is dependent upon the term, etc. Hence this relation is intended by nature.

165. Real of Logical relations.

Definition. A relation is either real or logical accordingly as it exists dependently upon an operation of the mind, or independently of it.

There are three conditions for a real relation.

a) The extremes must be real; otherwise either nothing would have a reference to something, or something would have reference to nothing.

b) The foundation must be real. For the relation is identified with the foundation; therefore unless the foundation is real, the relation cannot be real.

c) There must be a real distinction between the extremes. Relatives are opposed to each other; but nothing is really opposed to itself.

3. If one of these three conditions is absent, the relation is logical. Thus because of the defect of the first condition, the relation between the universal concept and its inferiors is logical; also the relation between an existing man and a possible man; between genus and its species. From the defect of the second condition, the relation between a standard and a nation which it represents is logical. From the defect of the third condition, the relation between subject and predicate of a proposition is logical. Cf. Coffey, page 339.

Hence a logical relation can be defined; "One whose elements are not a *parte rei* but are placed by the mind."

NOTE. For a transcendental relation to be real the actual existence of the term is not required. The reason is because the relation is identified with the essence of the subject.

NOTE. A relation in the broader sense includes both the logical and the real relation. In the broad sense it includes only the real relation, transcendental or predicamental; in the strict sense only the real predicamental relation.

166. Mutual and mixed relations.

A mutual relation is real or logical by both terms; a mixed relation or non-mutual relation is real on the part of one term, logical on the part of the other. Thus a mutual real relation exists between a created effect and a created cause. A mutual logical relation exists between a genus and a species. A mixed relation exists between the thing known and the intellect knowing. Some call the mixed relation logical.

THESIS XVI.

There exist real relations, both transcendental and predicamental.

167.

We are asking in the thesis whether something outside of our cognition corresponds to our concept of relation, or whether every relation is an entity of reason.

The adversaries are the Atomists and the Materialists, who admit nothing in nature except absolute things. The foremost adversary of the thesis is Locke. According to him a relation is a mere extrinsic denomination, namely, the mind attributes a relation to an absolute thing because another absolute thing co-exists with it. Hence the relation formally considered, arises solely from a comparison of the mind; but in nature itself there exists nothing except the foundation of a relation, namely the co-existence of absolute things. According to us the relation is often an intrinsic denomination, that is, the relation formally considered, namely, the reference of one thing to another exists in nature.

168.

The sense of the thesis. We concede that our mind forms for itself many relations by which it endeavors to deduce to a system the things which exist in the world. But we contend that, besides these, there exist real relations, that is, that many things have a natural reference to others, whether the mind recognizes this reference or not.

NOTE. This thesis is certain.

Proof of the Thesis

169.

A real relation is the reference of one thing to another which exists independent of the operation of the mind. But independent of the operation of the mind, there exists this reference of one thing to another. Therefore there exist real relations.

Proof of the MINOR.

a) Transcendental relations; Even with no thought of the mind, the creature essentially is dependent upon God, accident upon substance; moreover, there exists the essential habitude of the soul to the body, of matter to form, of potency to its object, etc.

b) Predicamental relations; even in the absence of all thought, men are similar in color, age, size; there exist cause and effect; there exist families and society.

Corollary I. Therefore a real relation is not rightly defined as an entity of reason with a foundation in reality. Coffey p. 352.

Difficulties

170.

1. A relation supposes comparison; but comparison is an operation of the mind. Therefore relation depends upon an operation of the mind.

R. I distinguish the major. The relation as it exists in things, I deny; as known, I concede. Thus the effect depends upon its cause, not because the mind so thinks of it, but on the contrary, the mind so thinks of it, because in the real order the effect really depends on the cause.

2. But at least the relation of similitude supposes comparison, for similitude is the agreement of many things according to one characteristic. But this unity does not pertain to many things except as a result of an operation of the mind. Therefore similitude supposes an operation of the mind.

R. I distinguish the major. Similitude as it exists in things, I deny; as it is conceived by the mind, I concede. I distinguish the minor. This unity does not belong to things actually and formally, I concede; potentially and fundamentally, I deny.

3. Therefore similitude exists in things only fundamentally.

R. I distinguish; logical similitude, I concede; the formalities which are apprehended by the mind in one concept, I deny.

4. Real entity is something. But a relation is not something, but "ad aliquid", as Aristotle says. Therefore relation is not a real entity.

R. I concede the major; I distinguish the minor. It is not something really distinct from its foundation, I concede; something identical, with its foundation, I deny.

BOOK III.

THE CAUSES OF BEING.

INTRODUCTION

171.

The world in which we live is neither altogether immutable nor altogether mutable. On the one hand all the entities which are the objects of our experience are constantly changing. Inorganic things, like water, air, the earth are in a constant state of flux; organic things evolve themselves to maturity and perish; the stars themselves do not escape the universal law of change. Hence Heraclitus concluded that nothing is but all things are becoming. On the other hand there is present in the world immutability and constancy. The changes themselves are immutable since they recur periodically. And it is clear that they are ruled by laws which do not change. Species of three kingdoms, mineral, vegetable and animal, remain the same in all these changes; the air remains always air, water, water, etc., nay the same elements are found in the sun and in the most remote stars. Hence Parmenides concluded that nothing becomes, but all things are. Both of these, Heraclitus and Parmenides contradict experience. In the middle way is the truth. The material world is subject to perpetual changes but at the same time something remains immutable, namely the laws and order of nature. The world is neither a fiery sea as Heraclitus thought, nor a frozen sea as Parmenides maintained.

172.

Hence things not only **are**, but also **become**; and we can distinguish between **static being** and **kinetic being**. So far we have only considered static being. It is now time to explain kinetic being. But whatever explains change is called a cause; hence our question now is on **causes**. There are three special reasons why general metaphysics should treat of causes;

a. There is no entity which is not in some way or other a cause; hence cause is, as it were, a property of being. And it is the proper object of metaphysics to treat of being and those things which are consequent on being.

b. All entity, except God is caused. Therefore, we cannot understand creatures fully without some understanding of the notion of cause.

c. Science is the cognition of things through their causes. Therefore, the nature of cause in general must be considered in the first science, which is general metaphysics.

We divide this treatise into three Chapters.

Chapter 1. The notion of cause.

Chapter 2. On efficient cause.

Chapter 3. On final cause.

CHAPTER I.

PRINCIPLE

173. Principle is defined by Aristotle: "That from which something is, or becomes or is known"; by St. Thomas: "That from which something, in some way or other, follows."

For a principle two things are required: (a) that that which is said to be a principle should be before the principiate; that which follows, is secondary: (b) that there should be a nexus between the principle and the principiate. We must therefore examine the concepts of priority and nexus.

PRIORITY

174.

Prior is that after which is something else. It is not the same as first. First is that before which nothing is; or that which does not follow after something else, but after which something follows. A principle in general need not be first, it is sufficient if it is prior. For in a principle we do not attend to antecedents.

175.

Division. We omit priority of origin, which exists between the three Divine Persons, and we divide priority only in the natural order.

a) **Logically** prior is that which leads up into the knowledge of something else, e.g., signs.

b) **Ontologically** prior is that which in reality precedes other things.

c) **Prior in time** is that which exists, whilst other things are not yet existing, e.g., Demonsthenes before Cicero.

b) Prior by nature is that upon the existence of which depends the existence of something else. e.g., father and son.

c) Prior by reason is that which, although it is neither in time nor by nature prior to something else, is nevertheless conceived as prior to something else, e.g., the essence of a thing relative to its properties.

One thing can be to another, (a) prior in time, but not by nature, e.g., Demosthenes with regard to Cicero; (b) prior by nature but not in time; e.g., a cause formally considered with regard to its effect; (c) prior in time and nature, e.g., the artificer with regard to a work of art.

NEXUS

176.

1. Extrinsic nexus; when one thing precedes another without any positive influx, e.g., when the principle is not a reason for the existence of the principiate.

2. Intrinsic nexus; when one thing exercises a positive influence upon another that is, when the principle is the reason why other things are. This influence can be;

a) in the logical order, when one thing gives cognoscibility to another. b) in the ontological order, when one thing gives entity to another thing.

CAUSE

177.

1. Cause is a principle having positive influence on the entity of something else.

Principle is that whence something is, or becomes.

Influence means to give or to communicate.

Positive means to exclude condition and occasion.

Entity means existence "of another thing".

2. Effect. The effect is that upon which the principle has positive influence with regard to its entity, or it is that which through the influence of a cause passes from the state of non-entity to entity.

Hence the effect is necessarily by nature posterior to the cause; the cause is by nature prior to the effect. With regard to priority of time, however, a distinction is necessary. The cause, formally considered, is simultaneous in time with regard to the effect, for the cause cannot actually cause, unless it actually flows into the entity of something else. The cause, materially considered, namely, the principle apt to positively

influence the entity of something else, can in time, be prior to the effect. Moreover between cause and effect there exists a real distinction, and a real relation.

3. Causality is that by which cause is formally constituted as actually causing. In reality it is nothing else than the influence by which the cause communicates entity to the effect.

4. A cause is altogether different from a condition and an occasion. However, it is not easy to distinguish these things.

a) Condition is that which *per se* does not influence the effect, but is required that the cause may exercise its causality. Thus light is a condition for writing, a window for seeing. The condition, therefore, is required in as far as it disposes the cause or applies the cause, or at least removes obstacles from the exercise of causality. A general rule by which **condition** is distinguished from **cause** can scarcely be formulated unless perhaps in this way; A thing is only a condition if in it there is wanting a proportion to influence the entity of another thing, and if in the **effect** the perfection of that which we call the condition does not appear.

b) An occasion is that in the presence of which something happens. Thus darkness is an occasion of theft. An occasion has no positive influence on the effect, hence it differs from cause; nor is it required for the effect, hence it differs from condition. Nevertheless, it often exercises an indirect influence in as far as it solicits the free will and makes it more ready to act.

178.

3. Division of Cause.

a) First cause and second Cause.

First cause is God, because He depends upon no other **cause** for His activity. Second cause is creature, because in every action the creature depends on God.

NOTE. The Occasionalists deny this division.

b) Principal and instrumental cause. The principal cause operates by virtue of its form to which the effect is assimilated, as fire heats in virtue of its own warmth. Instrumental cause does not act in virtue of its own form but only in virtue of the motion by which it is moved by the principal cause. Hence the effect is not assimilated to the instrument but to the principal agent, as a desk is not

assimilated to the instrument of the carpenter, but to the art which is in the mind of the artificer.

c) **Necessary and free cause.** Necessary cause is that which when all prerequisites for activity are present cannot **not act**. Free cause is that which, when all is present which is requisite for its activity, remains indifferent.

NOTE. (a) A necessary cause always acts in as far as it can; not so free cause: (b) The same necessary causes produce the same effect; not so free causes.

d) **Cause per se and per accidens.** A necessary cause is said to be **per se**, relative to that for the effecting of which it is determined by nature; with regard to other things it is said to be **per accidens**. A free cause is said to be **per se** relative to those things which happen according to the intention of the agent, with regard to others it is said to be **per accidens**. Examples may be found in Frick, No. 326.

e) **Physical and Moral Cause.** Physical cause produces its effect by physical influence. A Moral Cause induces the will of another to act. This can happen by command, by counsel, by entreaty.

f) **Total Cause and Partial Cause.** Total cause is that which, alone, without the concurrence of another cause of the same nature and order, can produce the effect. A partial cause cannot alone produce the effect.

g) **Mediate and Immediate Cause.** Immediate cause is that which by its immediate action produces the effect. Mediate cause is that which places the cause of the effect; thus he who produces arms is the mediate cause of death; he who uses the arms is the immediate cause. To this division belongs the axiom; "the cause of a cause is the cause of the thing caused", that is, the effect is attributed to the mediate cause.

h) **Efficient Cause, Formal Cause, Material Cause, and Final Cause.** This division is of the greatest importance throughout the whole course of philosophy. According as there is a different causality, or a difference in the influence of the cause on the effect, the cause itself is different. But this influence is four-fold. The minor is evident from a consideration of some work of art, for the production of which these four causes evidently concur. Efficient and final cause are said to be extrinsic; material and formal cause are said to be intrinsic.

CHAPTER II.

ON EFFICIENT CAUSALITY

179.

Efficient cause is a principle which by its **action** determines the existence of something new. It differs, therefore, from the cause in general in this, that its influence consists in **action**. With regard to this definition two things are to be considered; A) the principle is the power of activity. The principle does not act by the very fact that it is, but can be in a three-fold state;

a) In its **first and remote act**, which is the mere **potency** to act.

b) In its **first and proximate act**, which is the **potency fully prepared** to act.

c) In its **second act**, which is the principle here and now acting. Thus a writer in himself is in **first act**; the writer asleep is in the **first and remote act**; the writer sitting at a table with pen and ink is in the **first and proximate act**; the writer actually writing is in the **second act**.

B) **Action**. This is the exercise of activity, that is, it is that by which the agent is formally constituted in the second act. Hence action is conceived as being midway between the agent and the effect, that is, as the formal determination by which the agent causes, and by which the effect proceeds. Action is said to be **transient**, if the action extends outside of the agent; it is said to be **immanent** if the action remains in the agent. Moreover we distinguish substantial and accidental acts. By the first, substance is produced, by the second, accident is produced.

C) **Effect** is the new thing which is produced by the notion of the efficient cause. This new thing is called the **intrinsic term** of the action; the subject which received the new thing is called the **extrinsic term** of the action.

NOTE. Therefore the word effect has a two-fold signification; in the wide sense it refers to any cause; in the strict sense it refers to efficient cause alone.

Query. Nothing gives what it has not. But a cause gives entity to a thing. Hence arises the question: how does the cause contain the effect? **Answer:**

a) The whole effect is contained in the cause virtually, that is the cause has the power of producing the effect.

b) The effect is contained in the cause either formally or eminently according as the cause is univocal or analogous. That is a **univocal** cause which produces an effect of the same species, as when an animal generates another animal. An Analogical cause produces an effect of a different species, as when an artificer produces a statue.

THESIS XVII.

The principle of sufficient reason and the principle of causality are analytical and absolutely certain.

180.

Reason is that by which something is understood. Reason means almost the same thing as principle. For a principle is that by which something is, or becomes or is understood. Reason has primary reference to the logical order or the order of cognition. But cognition to be perfect, ought to be conformed to the ontological order. Therefore, that our cognition may be perfect, that by which the thing is understood, ought to be that by which the thing is or becomes. In other words, the principles of things contain the reasons of things. There are principles of essence and principles of existence. Principles of essence are **intrinsic** causes; principles of existence are **extrinsic** causes.

Therefore the sufficient reason of essence is the definition. The sufficient reason of existence is the efficient and final cause.

181.

The principle of sufficient reason is formulated negatively thus; "Nothing is without a sufficient reason". Positively: "Whatever is, has a sufficient reason of itself" NOTE. This principle is primarily understood **ontologically**, that is, whatever is, has its definition and a full reason why it exists. Secondarily it is understood logically, that is, whatever is, has that by which it can be understood.

182.

The principle of causality is formulated thus; "Nothing becomes without a cause"; (Becomes here means transition from non-entity to entity,) "It is formulated **positively**. "Whatever begins to exist, has an efficient cause of itself.

These two principles differ ;

- a) By their subject, whatever is—whatever becomes.
- b) By their extension, the principle of sufficient reason is more universal than the principle of causality; the principle of causality is restricted to those things which begin to exist.
- c) By their predicates. The first postulates a sufficient reason. The second postulates an efficient cause.

183.

Analytic judgment is that in which the predicate is attributed to the subject solely because of analysis and comparison of terms. It is opposed to a synthetic judgment in which the predicate is attributed to its subject solely on account of experience. To prove that these two principles are analytic we must prove that the predicates are necessarily contained in the concept of the subject.

184.

Adversaries: The Positivists, Kant and his followers, deny the principle of causality. Also the Materialists, who to escape the admission of a first cause of all things, declare that the principle of causality has validity only in the corporeal world.

Proof of the First Part

185.

Whatever is, is opposed to nothing. Therefore whatever is has something by which it is opposed to nothing, that is, it has a sufficient reason why it is entity and not nothing. For if such a reason were not required entity could at the same time be entity and nothing. But this is impossible. Therefore whatever is entity has a sufficient reason why it is entity.

Proof of the Second Part

186.

When something begins to exist there ought to be a sufficient reason why it begins to exist. This is evident from the first part. This reason is either in the thing which begins to exist or in something else. But it is not in the thing which begins to exist; therefore it is in something else. This other thing unless it determines the thing which begins to exist by a real positive influence, is to the thing which begins as if it were not. Therefore this other thing ought to determine the thing which begins to exist by a real positive influence. But extrinsic things which by real positive in-

fluence determine the existence of other things are **efficient causes**. Therefore in the concept of the thing which **begins** to exist, is contained the influence of a real efficient cause or the **dependence** upon an efficient cause.

With regard to the **FIRST MINOR**.

The sufficient reason of the beginning to exist cannot be in the thing beginning. For this sufficient reason would be either the essence of the thing or its possibility. But it cannot be its essence, for this is contingent and indifferent to existence or non-existence; nor can it be its possibility, otherwise the possibles would all exist.

187.

NOTE: The principle of causality is also formulated thus: "whatever contingently exists, requires an efficient cause of its existence." How this principle may be proved to be analytic is shown by Frick, No. 337. The principle thus enunciated extends itself not only to new entity, but to conserved entity. The signs by which it is possible to recognize an entity as contingent are (a) the beginning of existence; (b) any defect or limitation. For necessary entity is eternal and infinite.

Corollary 1. Therefore, no entity can be an efficient cause of itself. For it would simultaneously exist and not exist. It would also be prior and posterior to itself. A thing however can be a sufficient reason of itself, as God is His own sufficient reason.

188.

Corollary 2. Therefore for the same reason two entities cannot be the mutual efficient causes of each other.

189.

Corollary 3. Therefore, whatever begins to exist is rightly said to be an effect. For it is effected by the real influence of the efficient cause. Hence the principle of causality is also enunciated: "every effect has an efficient cause of itself."

190.

Corollary 4. Therefore chance is repugnant, although it is postulated by the Atheists as the origin of the world. Chance, thus defined is an event without any cause. This is absolute chance. Relative chance is an event which was neither intended nor foreseen. Such **chance** exists relative to men but not relative to God.

Difficulties

191.

1. That which begins to exist can arise by chance. For there are many chance things in this world.

R. I distinguish the antecedent; by chance in the absolute sense, I deny; by chance in the relative sense; I subdistinguish. That is without the intention or prevision of men, I concede; without the intention or prevision of God, I deny.

2. That which begins to exist can arise from itself.

R. I deny the antecedent. That which begins to exist requires an efficient cause. But it cannot be an efficient cause of itself.

3. To admit the principle of causality is to say, that all effects would be necessary. For, with all the pre-requisites present, the effect would necessarily follow. But not all effects are necessary.

R. 1. I deny the antecedent. The sense of the principle is this; if there is present an effect, that is, if something begins to exist, there must of necessity be an efficient cause. The sense is not this; if there is given a cause, there is also given an effect.

R. 2. I transmit the major. I distinguish the reason given. Granted a cause in second act, I concede; granted a cause in proximate act, I subdistinguish. If the cause is free, I deny; if the cause is necessary, I subdistinguish. The effect follows with the physical necessity, I concede; with metaphysical necessity I deny.

4. For the principle of causality to be analytical, the concept of existence ought to include the concept of cause. But the concept of existence does not include the concept of cause.

R. I distinguish the major. The concept of existence in general; I deny; the concept of an entity beginning to exist, I concede.

THESIS XVIII.

The concept of cause has objective validity.

192. We are speaking of the objective concept of cause. Consciousness gives clear testimony that we have a subjective concept of cause. For we easily distinguish between

mere succession without extrinsic connection; as condition and occasion, and cause. Besides all languages have many terms by which the notion of cause is expressed.

193. There are four kinds of causes. The term cause, however, by a special reason signifies efficient cause. The reason is because the influence of an efficient cause is plain to all.

194. Adversaries 1. The Sceptics amongst the ancients, Pyrrho, Sextus Empiricus, deny that causes exist or at least that we can know them with certitude.

2. Kant taught that cause was a mere subjective form, or an a priori category.

3. The principle adversaries of this thesis are the Empiricists, and the Positivists, as Locke, Hume, John Stuart Mill, etc. These say that causality is a mere succession of phenomena. According to them, we know that one phenomenon follows another, but we do not know that one depends upon another. They give different explanations of why some phenomena seem to depend upon antecedent phenomena, and why some do not, e.g., we think that the rain depends upon the clouds, but we do not think the day depends upon the night. Cf. Coffey, *Logic II*, pages 75-83; Rickaby, pages 313, 341-351.

NOTE 1. The one reason why Empiricists err with regard to the concept of cause is their fundamental error. They admit no knowledge except sensitive knowledge, and we do not perceive causal influx by the senses. The other reason is because they confound the two questions; (a) whether there are such things as efficient causes; and (b) whether we can know what is the determinate cause of a determinate effect.

Proof of the Thesis

195.

1. Whatever begins to be, necessarily has an efficient cause; but many things in the world begin to be, as is evident from the testimony of our senses. Therefore there exist efficient causes.

2. We produce at will in our soul many and multiple modifications; also in our body and things about us. But that which produces something new is a true cause of that which is produced.

Therefore there are efficient causes.

196.

Scholion 1. The origin of the notion of cause. It is beyond doubt that the notion of cause arises from experience, for it is a primitive concept, and with regard to it the axiom has validity that there is nothing in the intellect which was not first in the sense. It is disputed whether the notion of cause arises primarily from external or internal experience. There is a two-fold opinion. Cf. Coffey, pages 385-387, who holds that the concept of cause arises from consciousness, by which we apprehend ourselves as efficient causes of operations which we elicit by soul or body. Willems holds that the concept of cause primarily arises from external experience. His principle reason is that the concept of transient activity is more obvious to us than the concept of immanent activity. Besides he says we form the notion of immanent activity from the concept of transient activity.

197.

Scholion 2. How opposed to religion is the error of the Positivists is evident from its consequences. If there is no cause, there is no First Cause. From this would follow Atheism or at least Pantheism. If there is no cause, our actions are not imputable. Therefore, there would be no virtues and no crimes. Therefore it would be wrong to praise great deeds as well as to punish evil ones. In other words the whole moral order would be destroyed.

198.

Scholion 3. Occasionalism teaches that creatures, and especially bodies, are not efficient causes, but only occasions, in the presence of which God alone operates. The Occasionalists, therefore, deny the division of cause into first and second cause.

Difficulties

198.

1. The cause either precedes or accompanies or follows the effect. But it does not precede; for it is not a cause unless it produces the effect; nor does it accompany; otherwise with equal right an effect could be said to be the cause. Nor does it follow; otherwise the effect would be without cause. Therefore the notion of cause contains contradictory elements.

R. The cause precedes the effect by nature, but is simultaneous in point of time.

2. Hume. We are ignorant of the manner in which

cause acts, but the manner in which cause acts is the nexus of causality. Therefore we are ignorant of the cause itself.

R. I distinguish the major. We have no distinct and specific concept; I concede; confused and generic concept I deny.

3. Kant. Real cause would be noumenon. But we cannot know noumenon.

R. I deny the minor.

4. If we could perceive the causal nexus, we would not doubt with regard to cause. But we frequently doubt with regard to cause.

R. I distinguish the major. We would not doubt that the event had a cause, I concede, we would not doubt what was the determinate cause in the particular case, I sub-distinguish. Often, I concede; Never I deny.

NOTE. From the writings of the adversaries, it is evident that they confound two questions.

(a) Has something new a cause?

(b) What is the determinate cause of this new thing?

It can be that in a particular cases we cannot solve the second question. We can answer to the first with absolute certainty, as is evident from the preceding thesis.

5. The argument from the testimony of the senses supposes that there are bodies outside of us, and they are the causes of our knowledge. But it is lawful to suppose neither of these things, unless we have first proved the objective validity of the concept of cause. Therefore this argument is a *petitio principii*.

R. I distinguish the major. Supposes that there are bodies outside of us, I concede (For this is immediately evident); supposes that these bodies are the causes of our cognition, I sub-distinguish. In the ontological order, I concede; in the logical order, I deny. On account of this difficulty we do not prove the existence of bodies from the principle of causality but from the veracity of our cognoscitive faculties.

6. To ascribe to the concept of cause objective validity we ought to perceive the influx; for the influx is the formal element of causality. But we do not perceive the influx of cause into effect; for by experience we only perceive that one event follows another.

R. I distinguish the major. We ought to perceive the influx by the senses, I deny; by intellectual abstraction, I

concede. I distinguish the minor. We do not perceive the influx by the senses, I concede; by intellectual consciousness, I deny.

By intellectual consciousness, we immediately perceive that we freely place some act, and that we place others not freely; besides, we can change this influence according as we wish.

7. But we do not perceive this influx by intellectual consciousness. For consciousness refers facts, not the manner by which facts become. But the influx is the manner by which the facts become. Therefore not even by intellectual consciousness do we detect the causal influx.

R. I distinguish the major. It does not refer all manner of influx; I concede; some I deny. Otherwise how would we know that some facts are pleasing to us, others displeasing.

CHAPTER III.

FINAL CAUSE

THESIS XIX.

The end is a cause in the true and proper sense.

199. The end or final cause is that good for the sake of which something becomes; or it is the good for the sake of which the efficient cause acts. It implies attractive goodness which solicits the agent and the intention by which the agent wishes to obtain this goodness. It is distinct by a distinction of reason from the good, for the formal notion of good prescind from the notion of causality.

200. Divisions of the end.

1. The end **which**, or objective end, is the good itself which is intended.

The end **for which**, or the subjective end, is the subject for whom the good is intended. The end **by which**, or the formal end, is the characteristic under which the end **which** is intended namely, either the making or the possession or the communication of the end **which**. Thus whilst the sick man intends to obtain health, the sick man is the end **for which**, health is the end **which**, and the recovery of health is the end **by which**.

NOTE 1. These three are not three ends, but are inadequate characteristics of the one adequate end. For the sick man does not intend health in the abstract, but in as far as it is to be acquired in the concrete for himself, for he intends himself as healthy.

NOTE 2. In each one of the foregoing, the proper characteristic of end is found: for each one of these is loved in its own way on account of itself, and the objective end is referred to the subject not as a means of obtaining another end, but as a good to be obtained for the subject, and of itself attractive to him.

201. The end **which is to be effected** is that which does not exist beforehand but is intended as an object to be made by the agent; it moves the agent, therefore, to the operations which are necessary that it may **exist**, e.g., a picture to be painted. The end which is to be **obtained** is that which exists beforehand, but its **possession** is intended: It moves the agent, therefore, to activity, not that it may have **existence**, but that it may be **possessed**, e.g., money with regard to the merchant.

202. The end of the work is that end for which the work by its nature is intended, e.g. alms by their nature are ordered to relieve the wants of the poor. In this end can be distinguished, the end of the **operation**, or the effect towards which the act is proximately directed, and the end of the **work** accomplished, or the scope, or the use to which the effect tends of itself, e.g., the artificer intends to make a watch; this by its nature is intended to tell time. The end of the one operating is that which the agent freely sets for himself and which is outside of the nature of the work, e.g., if one should give alms for vain glory.

203. The proximate end is that which is immediately intended; the intermediate end is that for the sake of which the proximate end is intended, but which is ordered to a further end; the ultimate end is that which is intended for itself and is not ordered for any further end. The ultimate end can be either **negatively** ultimate, which **de facto** is not ordered to an ulterior end, although it could be so ordered; or which is **secundum quid** ultimate, which in a certain series of ends is not ordered to any further end; or **simply** ultimate, which cannot be ordered to any further end.

204. The end is a cause in the true and proper sense, that is, it is not a mere condition, nor a cause in the analogical sense, but is a cause in the proper sense. A cause in the true and proper sense connotes two things, first the power of a cause in the first and proximate act, and secondly the exercise of causality by which it influences the effect. But since physical existence is not necessarily of the essence of the final cause, the end is said to be a cause in as far as it moves the efficient cause to act, not through any physical action, which precedes from the virtue of the end, but in view of an act of cognition and of will, either on the part of the immediate efficient cause, or of some other entity which aptly disposes the mediate efficient cause to obtain this end, and not only disposes it but inclines and directs it. Therefore final causality,

- a) in the first remote act is the object or goodness of the end;
- b) in the first and proximate act consists either in the same goodness apprehended in as far as in this manner the efficient cause is disposed and inclined to attain the end, or in the nature of the entity that has been intrinsically determined by God with regard to this end, so that operating according to the nature and natural disposition and inclination of its forces, it effects or attains this end.
- c) causality in the second act are those actions of the efficient cause is as far as they are dependent on the end. Therefore final causality in the second act is distinguished from efficient causality in the second act, not by a real distinction, but by one of reason. The same action which precedes from the eliciting agent as a cause is the same action which precedes from the end as the soliciting and inspiring cause.

NOTE. With regard to the final causality of irrational creatures there is question in Cosmology. It is sufficient now to prove the thesis with regard to men.

Proof of the Thesis

205. That which by its positive influence determines the agent to activity, is a true cause of the effect produced by that agent; but the end by its positive influence determines the agent to activity. Therefore the end is a cause of the effect produced by that agent in the true and proper sense.

Relative to the MAJOR. The effect remains indifferent to existence and as it were suspended until the agent is determined to activity.

Therefore that which by its positive influence determines the agent to activity has positive influence on the existence of the effect produced by the agent or is the cause of that effect.

Relative to the MINOR. It is evident from experience that every intellectual agent is actuated by intention and a final motive; and so he who acts without a rational motive is said to act foolishly. The reason of this fact is gathered from the nature of an intelligent agent, who, as such, is only determined by a motive proposed to the will by the intellect. The end, therefore, is the object which first known and proposed to the will moves the will to the physical actions that must be elicited and commanded to obtain this effect.

206. Scholion 1. The end differs from the efficient moral cause, for the cause to be morally efficient ought to be physically existing, but the end can be a cause without physical existence. Besides the efficient moral causes moves not to the attainment of itself but to the attainment of some other good; the end solicits to the possession of itself.

207. Scholion 2. The end differs from the motive as the species from the genus for the motive is that which known, moves the knowing agent to activity, whether the agent tries to obtain this thing or not; it is of the nature of a final cause that the agent strives to attain this end. Thus a clear day can be the motive but not the end of a walk.

Difficulties

208. 1. The cause is prior to the effect. But the end is often not prior to the effect.

R. I distinguish. The efficient cause, I concede; the final cause, I sub-distinguish; in order of the intention, I concede; necessarily in the physical order, I deny.

2. For a cause to act, it ought first to exist. But the end often does not exist but is effected through the operation of the agent.

R. The same as to the first objection.

3. If the end were a cause, it would be a cause of itself. But nothing can be a cause of itself.

R. I distinguish the major. It would be an efficient cause of itself, I deny; a final cause of itself, I sub-distinguish;

under a different aspect, namely, itself as possible and known would be a cause of itself as existing, I concede; would be a cause of itself under the same aspect, I deny. The final cause and the effect of it are not distinguished adequately and positively, but inadequately, and negatively, namely as a good not yet existing but known from the same good existing.

4. All action proceeds from the will. Therefore an end from which it proceeds would be superfluous.

R. I distinguish the antecedent. It proceeds from the will as a partial cause, I concede; as a total cause, I subdistinguish; with the totality of effect, I concede; with the totality of cause, I deny. The will and the end concur. The will as an efficient cause, the end as an intentional and soliciting cause.

THE END.

Although possibles are not entirely nothing
yet they have no actual internal reality.

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ideoque naturaliter in ordinatur ad
compositum substantiae constituen-
dum: angelus, homo, arbor.

Substantia Incompleta quae non inhaerent

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